FKIE_CVE-2026-44726
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-23 18:17 - Updated: 2026-10-25 23:109.1 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/
| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| security-advisories@github.com | https://github.com/denoland/deno/security/advisories/GHSA-chqv-56wv-7564 | Exploit, Vendor Advisory |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "deno",
"vendor": "denoland",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 2.0.0, \u003c 2.7.8"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:deno:deno:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "CA8392FC-2247-4255-A9DA-3DC08146AF63",
"versionEndExcluding": "2.7.8",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.0.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Deno is a JavaScript, TypeScript, and WebAssembly runtime. From 2.0.0 until 2.7.8, a flaw in Deno\u0027s Node.js tls compatibility layer could cause a TLS client to transmit application data in plaintext after a connection retry. When `autoSelectFamily was enabled and the first address-family attempt failed, the socket reinitialization path reused a stale TLS upgrade hook that was bound to the original, failed handle. As a result, the replacement TCP connection was never upgraded to TLS, and any data the application wrote before the secureConnect event travelled over the network unencrypted. A network attacker positioned to cause the initial connection attempt to fail (for example, by dropping IPv6 traffic on a dual-stack host) could deterministically trigger the fallback path and observe or tamper with traffic that the application believed was TLS-protected. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.7.8."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Deno es un entorno de ejecuci\u00f3n de JavaScript, TypeScript y WebAssembly. Desde 2.0.0 hasta 2.7.8, un fallo en la capa de compatibilidad TLS de Node.js de Deno podr\u00eda causar que un cliente TLS transmita datos de aplicaci\u00f3n en texto plano despu\u00e9s de un reintento de conexi\u00f3n. Cuando \u2019autoSelectFamily\u2019 estaba habilitado y el primer intento de familia de direcciones fall\u00f3, la ruta de reinicializaci\u00f3n del socket reutiliz\u00f3 un \u2019hook\u2019 de actualizaci\u00f3n TLS obsoleto que estaba vinculado al \u2019handle\u2019 original y fallido. Como resultado, la conexi\u00f3n TCP de reemplazo nunca se actualiz\u00f3 a TLS, y cualquier dato que la aplicaci\u00f3n escribi\u00f3 antes del evento secureConnect viaj\u00f3 por la red sin cifrar. Un atacante de red posicionado para causar que el intento de conexi\u00f3n inicial fallara (por ejemplo, al descartar tr\u00e1fico IPv6 en un host de doble pila) podr\u00eda activar de forma determinista la ruta de respaldo y observar o manipular el tr\u00e1fico que la aplicaci\u00f3n cre\u00eda que estaba protegido por TLS. Esta vulnerabilidad est\u00e1 corregida en 2.7.8."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-44726",
"lastModified": "2026-10-25T23:10:00.167",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 7.4,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
"impactScore": 5.2,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 9.1,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.2,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-44726",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-06-25T03:55:51.795074Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-06-23T18:17:48.623",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/denoland/deno/security/advisories/GHSA-chqv-56wv-7564"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-319"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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