FKIE_CVE-2026-44359
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-20 00:16 - Updated: 2026-10-24 20:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "firmware",
"vendor": "meshtastic",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 2.7.21.1370b23"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. Prior to version 2.7.21.1370b23, the Meshtastic GitHub repository\u0027s main_matrix.yml workflow is triggered by pull_request_target and multiple jobs check out the attacker\u0027s fork code and execute it with access to repository secrets and elevated GITHUB_TOKEN permissions. No approval gate exists. Pull requests from external users with author_association: \"NONE\" triggered the CI workflow automatically. The workflow directly executes attacker-controlled files from the fork checkout. This issue could have resulted in supply chain compromise, self-hosted runner compromise, and/or repository takeover for the repo. This issue is separate from GHSA-6mwm-v2vv-pp96, which addressed a command injection via github.head_ref in the setup job of the same workflow. That fix correctly moved to environment variables. However, the more critical fork checkout vulnerability across the check, build, and build-debian-src jobs was not addressed. Version 2.7.21.1370b23 contains a patch for thie issue."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Meshtastic es una soluci\u00f3n de red mallada de c\u00f3digo abierto. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 2.7.21.1370b23, el flujo de trabajo main_matrix.yml del repositorio de GitHub de Meshtastic se activaba mediante pull_request_target y m\u00faltiples trabajos extra\u00edan el c\u00f3digo del fork del atacante y lo ejecutaban con acceso a los secretos del repositorio y permisos elevados de GITHUB_TOKEN. No exist\u00eda una puerta de aprobaci\u00f3n. Las solicitudes de extracci\u00f3n de usuarios externos con author_association: \u2019NONE\u2019 activaban autom\u00e1ticamente el flujo de trabajo de CI. El flujo de trabajo ejecutaba directamente archivos controlados por el atacante desde la extracci\u00f3n del fork. Este problema podr\u00eda haber resultado en un compromiso de la cadena de suministro, un compromiso del runner autoalojado y/o una toma de control del repositorio. Este problema es independiente de GHSA-6mwm-v2vv-pp96, que abord\u00f3 una inyecci\u00f3n de comandos a trav\u00e9s de github.head_ref en el trabajo de configuraci\u00f3n del mismo flujo de trabajo. Esa correcci\u00f3n se movi\u00f3 correctamente a variables de entorno. Sin embargo, la vulnerabilidad m\u00e1s cr\u00edtica de extracci\u00f3n del fork en los trabajos de check, build y build-debian-src no fue abordada. La versi\u00f3n 2.7.21.1370b23 contiene un parche para este problema."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-44359",
"lastModified": "2026-10-24T20:10:00.137",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 10.0,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.8,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-44359",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-07-23T00:00:00+00:00",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-07-20T00:16:58.210",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1GdHT2s5hMYCiHt4zrWt1q58mvL7WQC0M/view?usp=sharing"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/meshtastic/firmware/commit/5716aeba3bc1e1d34fba9567ff88917ede4a78a5"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/meshtastic/firmware/security/advisories/GHSA-6mwm-v2vv-pp96"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/meshtastic/firmware/security/advisories/GHSA-mjx5-98jq-q736"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-94"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-829"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.