FKIE_CVE-2026-44321
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-27 17:16 - Updated: 2026-10-14 20:10{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "free5gc",
"vendor": "free5gc",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 4.2.2"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:free5gc:free5gc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "EF7EBB95-EB4E-44C5-BF0A-9C99B0A7775F",
"versionEndExcluding": "4.2.2",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC\u0027s SMF mounts the UPI management route group without inbound OAuth2 middleware. The POST /upi/v1/upNodesLinks create-or-update handler accepts attacker-controlled JSON and passes it directly into UpNodesFromConfiguration(), which calls logger.InitLog.Fatalf(...) on several validation failures. One confirmed path is the UE-IP-pool overlap check: a single unauthenticated POST that adds a new UPF whose pool overlaps an existing UPF terminates the entire SMF process (docker ps shows Exited (1)), not just the goroutine. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "free5GC es una implementaci\u00f3n de c\u00f3digo abierto de la red central 5G. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 4.2.2, el SMF de free5GC monta el grupo de rutas de gesti\u00f3n de UPI sin middleware OAuth2 entrante. El gestor POST /upi/v1/upNodesLinks create-or-update acepta JSON controlado por el atacante y lo pasa directamente a UpNodesFromConfiguration(), que llama a logger.InitLog.Fatalf(...) en varios fallos de validaci\u00f3n. Una ruta confirmada es la comprobaci\u00f3n de superposici\u00f3n de grupos de IP de UE: un \u00fanico POST no autenticado que a\u00f1ade un nuevo UPF cuyo grupo se superpone a un UPF existente termina todo el proceso SMF (docker ps muestra Exited (1)), no solo la goroutine. Esta vulnerabilidad est\u00e1 corregida en la versi\u00f3n 4.2.2."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-44321",
"lastModified": "2026-10-14T20:10:00.190",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-44321",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-05-27T17:53:25.117261Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-05-27T17:16:37.330",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Issue Tracking"
],
"url": "https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/906"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/security/advisories/GHSA-44qj-cghf-9p97"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/free5gc/smf/commit/e0974e07ddab44a67d36a563cca383b2449e33e5"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Issue Tracking",
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/free5gc/smf/pull/203"
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/security/advisories/GHSA-44qj-cghf-9p97"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-306"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-617"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-862"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.