FKIE_CVE-2026-44319
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-27 17:16 - Updated: 2026-10-14 20:10{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "free5gc",
"vendor": "free5gc",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 4.2.2"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:free5gc:free5gc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "EF7EBB95-EB4E-44C5-BF0A-9C99B0A7775F",
"versionEndExcluding": "4.2.2",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. Prior to 4.2.2, free5GC\u0027s NEF terminates the entire process when a stored PFD-subscription notifyUri cannot be reached. In PfdChangeNotifier.FlushNotifications(), the notifier calls NnefPFDmanagementNotify(...) and on any delivery error invokes logger.PFDManageLog.Fatal(err), which is os.Exit(1)-equivalent in Go. An attacker who can create a PFD subscription with an attacker-chosen notifyUri and then trigger a PFD change can deterministically kill NEF on the asynchronous delivery attempt -- the process exits with status 1, dropping NEF\u0027s entire SBI surface until restart. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.2."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "free5GC es una implementaci\u00f3n de c\u00f3digo abierto de la red central 5G. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 4.2.2, el NEF de free5GC termina todo el proceso cuando no se puede alcanzar un notifyUri de suscripci\u00f3n PFD almacenado. En PfdChangeNotifier.FlushNotifications(), el notificador llama a NnefPFDmanagementNotify(...) y ante cualquier error de entrega invoca logger.PFDManageLog.Fatal(err), que es equivalente a os.Exit(1) en Go. Un atacante que puede crear una suscripci\u00f3n PFD con un notifyUri elegido por el atacante y luego desencadenar un cambio de PFD puede terminar el NEF de forma determinista en el intento de entrega as\u00edncrona -- el proceso sale con estado 1, interrumpiendo toda la superficie SBI del NEF hasta el reinicio. Esta vulnerabilidad est\u00e1 corregida en la versi\u00f3n 4.2.2."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-44319",
"lastModified": "2026-10-14T20:10:00.190",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-44319",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-05-28T14:15:45.991017Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-05-27T17:16:37.033",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Issue Tracking"
],
"url": "https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/924"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/security/advisories/GHSA-rxrq-fv76-26pr"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/free5gc/nef/commit/f110517b1189801950b50668a593398687049074"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Issue Tracking",
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/free5gc/nef/pull/25"
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Issue Tracking"
],
"url": "https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/924"
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/security/advisories/GHSA-rxrq-fv76-26pr"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-20"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-617"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-755"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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