FKIE_CVE-2026-43073
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-05 16:16 - Updated: 2026-11-11 21:10| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 4.2 |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h",
"arch/x86/lib/copy_user_uncached_64.S",
"arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c",
"drivers/infiniband/sw/rdmavt/qp.c",
"drivers/ntb/ntb_transport.c",
"tools/objtool/check.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "73c2dc2c14d6a2efa5dde469546a907482af07fe",
"status": "affected",
"version": "06917f753547e6bba8a5d17f79971d1c071a70dd",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "14b9194db4a28421a4dbe5d6e519efbaa7c5f3cd",
"status": "affected",
"version": "06917f753547e6bba8a5d17f79971d1c071a70dd",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c6d4e0599e7e73abc04e2488dfeb7940c4039660",
"status": "affected",
"version": "06917f753547e6bba8a5d17f79971d1c071a70dd",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "d993e1723aa2a085aa0d72e70ea889031fc225b4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "06917f753547e6bba8a5d17f79971d1c071a70dd",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "efea91ad1729ff1853d7418e4d3bc27d085e72d0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "06917f753547e6bba8a5d17f79971d1c071a70dd",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "d187a86de793f84766ea40b9ade7ac60aabbb4fe",
"status": "affected",
"version": "06917f753547e6bba8a5d17f79971d1c071a70dd",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h",
"arch/x86/lib/copy_user_uncached_64.S",
"arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c",
"drivers/infiniband/sw/rdmavt/qp.c",
"drivers/ntb/ntb_transport.c",
"tools/objtool/check.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.2"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.2",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.160",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.83",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.24",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.19.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.19.14",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.0.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.0.1",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "7EAD2A48-6484-47C2-9723-CCEFA50056E8",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.12.83",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.2.1",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "8126B8B8-6D0B-4443-86C1-672AEE893555",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.24",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.13",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "D6A8A074-BBF4-4803-ABED-519A839435BB",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.19.14",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.19",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "9B5888AB-7403-4335-89E4-21CC0B48366A",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.0.1",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:4.2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "37D5F2FA-B7D0-4F9D-BC97-F450E5839C7B",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nx86-64: rename misleadingly named \u0027__copy_user_nocache()\u0027 function\n\nThis function was a masterclass in bad naming, for various historical\nreasons.\n\nIt claimed to be a non-cached user copy. It is literally _neither_ of\nthose things. It\u0027s a specialty memory copy routine that uses\nnon-temporal stores for the destination (but not the source), and that\ndoes exception handling for both source and destination accesses.\n\nAlso note that while it works for unaligned targets, any unaligned parts\n(whether at beginning or end) will not use non-temporal stores, since\nonly words and quadwords can be non-temporal on x86.\n\nThe exception handling means that it _can_ be used for user space\naccesses, but not on its own - it needs all the normal \"start user space\naccess\" logic around it.\n\nBut typically the user space access would be the source, not the\nnon-temporal destination. That was the original intention of this,\nwhere the destination was some fragile persistent memory target that\nneeded non-temporal stores in order to catch machine check exceptions\nsynchronously and deal with them gracefully.\n\nThus that non-descriptive name: one use case was to copy from user space\ninto a non-cached kernel buffer. However, the existing users are a mix\nof that intended use-case, and a couple of random drivers that just did\nthis as a performance tweak.\n\nSome of those random drivers then actively misused the user copying\nversion (with STAC/CLAC and all) to do kernel copies without ever even\ncaring about the exception handling, _just_ for the non-temporal\ndestination.\n\nRename it as a first small step to actually make it halfway sane, and\nchange the prototype to be more normal: it doesn\u0027t take a user pointer\nunless the caller has done the proper conversion, and the argument size\nis the full size_t (it still won\u0027t actually copy more than 4GB in one\ngo, but there\u0027s also no reason to silently truncate the size argument in\nthe caller).\n\nFinally, use this now sanely named function in the NTB code, which\nmis-used a user copy version (with STAC/CLAC and all) of this interface\ndespite it not actually being a user copy at all."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\nx86-64: renombrar la funci\u00f3n con el nombre enga\u00f1oso \u2019__copy_user_nocache()\u2019\n\nEsta funci\u00f3n fue una clase magistral de mala denominaci\u00f3n, por varias razones hist\u00f3ricas.\n\nAfirmaba ser una copia de usuario no cacheada. Literalmente _no_ es ninguna de esas dos cosas. Es una rutina de copia de memoria especializada que utiliza almacenamientos no temporales para el destino (pero no para el origen), y que realiza manejo de excepciones para los accesos tanto de origen como de destino.\n\nTambi\u00e9n hay que tener en cuenta que, si bien funciona para destinos no alineados, cualquier parte no alineada (ya sea al principio o al final) no utilizar\u00e1 almacenamientos no temporales, ya que solo las palabras y las palabras cu\u00e1druples pueden ser no temporales en x86.\n\nEl manejo de excepciones significa que _puede_ ser utilizada para accesos al espacio de usuario, pero no por s\u00ed sola; necesita toda la l\u00f3gica normal de \u2019inicio de acceso al espacio de usuario\u2019 a su alrededor.\n\nPero t\u00edpicamente el acceso al espacio de usuario ser\u00eda el origen, no el destino no temporal. Esa fue la intenci\u00f3n original de esto, donde el destino era alg\u00fan objetivo de memoria persistente fr\u00e1gil que necesitaba almacenamientos no temporales para capturar excepciones de verificaci\u00f3n de m\u00e1quina de forma s\u00edncrona y manejarlas con elegancia.\n\nDe ah\u00ed ese nombre no descriptivo: un caso de uso era copiar desde el espacio de usuario a un b\u00fafer del kernel no cacheado. Sin embargo, los usuarios existentes son una mezcla de ese caso de uso previsto y un par de controladores aleatorios que simplemente hicieron esto como un ajuste de rendimiento.\n\nAlgunos de esos controladores aleatorios luego hicieron un mal uso activo de la versi\u00f3n de copia de usuario (con STAC/CLAC y todo) para hacer copias del kernel sin siquiera preocuparse por el manejo de excepciones, _solo_ por el destino no temporal.\n\nRenombrarla como un primer peque\u00f1o paso para hacerla realmente medio sensata, y cambiar el prototipo para que sea m\u00e1s normal: no toma un puntero de usuario a menos que el llamador haya realizado la conversi\u00f3n adecuada, y el tama\u00f1o del argumento es el size_t completo (todav\u00eda no copiar\u00e1 realmente m\u00e1s de 4GB de una sola vez, pero tampoco hay raz\u00f3n para truncar silenciosamente el argumento de tama\u00f1o en el llamador).\n\nFinalmente, usar esta funci\u00f3n ahora con un nombre sensato en el c\u00f3digo NTB, que hizo un mal uso de una versi\u00f3n de copia de usuario (con STAC/CLAC y todo) de esta interfaz a pesar de que en realidad no era una copia de usuario en absoluto."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-43073",
"lastModified": "2026-11-11T21:10:00.200",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 5.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-43073",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-06T15:27:55.354058Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-05-05T16:16:16.650",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/14b9194db4a28421a4dbe5d6e519efbaa7c5f3cd"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/73c2dc2c14d6a2efa5dde469546a907482af07fe"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6d4e0599e7e73abc04e2488dfeb7940c4039660"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
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],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d187a86de793f84766ea40b9ade7ac60aabbb4fe"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
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],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d993e1723aa2a085aa0d72e70ea889031fc225b4"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/efea91ad1729ff1853d7418e4d3bc27d085e72d0"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://project-zero.issues.chromium.org/issues/496923375"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "NVD-CWE-noinfo"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.