FKIE_CVE-2026-41684
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-07 14:16 - Updated: 2026-10-26 20:10| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| security-advisories@github.com | https://github.com/lxc/incus/releases/tag/v7.0.0 | Patch, Product | |
| security-advisories@github.com | https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-x5r6-jr56-89pv | Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linuxcontainers | incus | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "incus",
"vendor": "lxc",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 7.0.0"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:linuxcontainers:incus:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "CF8EBB4B-C1F0-44C5-B063-9CF8EB6E0972",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.0.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Incus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to version 7.0.0, backup.GetInfo() trusts the inline backup/index.yaml config when present and only falls back to parsing the legacy backup/container/backup.yaml file if result.Config == nil. As a result, an archive can carry a valid inline config that passes the initial import preflight while also carrying a malformed legacy backup/container/backup.yaml file that is reparsed later from the restored file system. ParseConfigYamlFile() accepts YAML documents with no container section, and multiple downstream consumers then dereference. Container without checking for nil. Confirmed examples in the instance restore and import flow include backup.UpdateInstanceConfig() and internalImportFromBackup(). An authenticated user with permission to import instance backups may be able to crash the Incus daemon with a crafted backup archive whose inline backup/index.yaml is valid but whose extracted legacy backup.yaml omits container. The crash occurs in the restore path after archive extraction has begun. This issue has been patched in version 7.0.0."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Incus es un gestor de contenedores de sistema y m\u00e1quinas virtuales. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 7.0.0, backup.GetInfo() conf\u00eda en la configuraci\u00f3n en l\u00ednea backup/index.yaml cuando est\u00e1 presente y solo recurre al an\u00e1lisis del archivo heredado backup/container/backup.yaml si result.Config == nil. Como resultado, un archivo puede contener una configuraci\u00f3n en l\u00ednea v\u00e1lida que pasa la verificaci\u00f3n previa de importaci\u00f3n inicial, mientras que tambi\u00e9n contiene un archivo heredado backup/container/backup.yaml malformado que se vuelve a analizar m\u00e1s tarde desde el sistema de archivos restaurado. ParseConfigYamlFile() acepta documentos YAML sin secci\u00f3n de contenedor, y m\u00faltiples consumidores posteriores desreferencian Contenedor sin verificar si es nulo. Ejemplos confirmados en el flujo de restauraci\u00f3n e importaci\u00f3n de instancias incluyen backup.UpdateInstanceConfig() e internalImportFromBackup(). Un usuario autenticado con permiso para importar copias de seguridad de instancias podr\u00eda ser capaz de bloquear el demonio Incus con un archivo de copia de seguridad manipulado cuyo backup/index.yaml en l\u00ednea es v\u00e1lido, pero cuyo backup.yaml heredado extra\u00eddo omite contenedor. El bloqueo ocurre en la ruta de restauraci\u00f3n despu\u00e9s de que ha comenzado la extracci\u00f3n del archivo. Este problema ha sido parcheado en la versi\u00f3n 7.0.0."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-41684",
"lastModified": "2026-10-26T20:10:00.160",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 6.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-41684",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-05-07T13:45:52.042246Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-05-07T14:16:03.350",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch",
"Product"
],
"url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus/releases/tag/v7.0.0"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Mitigation",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-x5r6-jr56-89pv"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-476"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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