FKIE_CVE-2026-41081

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-04-27 14:16 - Updated: 2026-10-26 22:10
Summary
Improper Handling of TLS Client Authentication Failure Leading to Anonymous Principal Assignment in Apache Storm Versions Affected: up to 2.8.7 Description: When TLS transport is enabled in Apache Storm without requiring client certificate authentication (the default configuration), the TlsTransportPlugin assigns a fallback principal (CN=ANONYMOUS) if no client certificate is presented or if certificate verification fails. The underlying SSLPeerUnverifiedException is caught and suppressed rather than rejecting the connection. This fail-open behavior means an unauthenticated client can establish a TLS connection and receive a valid principal identity. If the configured authorizer (e.g., SimpleACLAuthorizer) does not explicitly deny access to CN=ANONYMOUS, this may result in unauthorized access to Storm services. The condition is logged at debug level only, reducing visibility in production. Impact: Unauthenticated clients may be assigned a principal identity, potentially bypassing authorization in permissive or misconfigured environments. Mitigation: Users should upgrade to 2.8.7 in which TLS authentication failures are handled in a fail-closed manner. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should: - Enable mandatory client certificate authentication (nimbus.thrift.tls.client.auth.required: true) - Ensure authorization rules explicitly deny access to CN=ANONYMOUS - Review all ACL configurations for implicit default-allow behavior
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
apache storm *

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2/",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "org.apache.storm:storm-client",
          "product": "Apache Storm Client",
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "2.8.7",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:storm:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "9286B022-3864-4ED1-B740-F1BD9B79820F",
              "versionEndExcluding": "2.8.7",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Improper Handling of TLS Client Authentication Failure Leading to Anonymous Principal Assignment in Apache Storm\n\nVersions Affected: up to 2.8.7\n\nDescription: When TLS transport is enabled in Apache Storm without requiring client certificate authentication (the default configuration), the TlsTransportPlugin assigns a fallback principal (CN=ANONYMOUS) if no client certificate is presented or if certificate verification fails. The underlying SSLPeerUnverifiedException is caught and suppressed rather than rejecting the connection.\n\nThis fail-open behavior means an unauthenticated client can establish a TLS connection and receive a valid principal identity. If the configured authorizer (e.g., SimpleACLAuthorizer) does not explicitly deny access to CN=ANONYMOUS, this may result in unauthorized access to Storm services. The condition is logged at debug level only, reducing visibility in production.\n\nImpact: Unauthenticated clients may be assigned a principal identity, potentially bypassing authorization in permissive or misconfigured environments.\n\nMitigation: Users should upgrade to 2.8.7 in which TLS authentication failures are handled in a fail-closed manner.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should:\n- Enable mandatory client certificate authentication (nimbus.thrift.tls.client.auth.required: true)\n- Ensure authorization rules explicitly deny access to CN=ANONYMOUS\n- Review all ACL configurations for implicit default-allow behavior"
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Manejo Inadecuado de Fallas en la Autenticaci\u00f3n de Cliente TLS que Conduce a la Asignaci\u00f3n de un Principal An\u00f3nimo en Apache Storm\n\nVersiones Afectadas: hasta la 2.8.7\n\nDescripci\u00f3n: Cuando el transporte TLS est\u00e1 habilitado en Apache Storm sin requerir autenticaci\u00f3n de certificado de cliente (la configuraci\u00f3n predeterminada), el TlsTransportPlugin asigna un principal de respaldo (CN=ANONYMOUS) si no se presenta ning\u00fan certificado de cliente o si la verificaci\u00f3n del certificado falla. La SSLPeerUnverifiedException subyacente es capturada y suprimida en lugar de rechazar la conexi\u00f3n.\n\nEste comportamiento de \u2019fail-open\u2019 significa que un cliente no autenticado puede establecer una conexi\u00f3n TLS y recibir una identidad principal v\u00e1lida. Si el autorizador configurado (por ejemplo, SimpleACLAuthorizer) no deniega expl\u00edcitamente el acceso a CN=ANONYMOUS, esto puede resultar en acceso no autorizado a los servicios de Storm. La condici\u00f3n se registra solo a nivel de depuraci\u00f3n, reduciendo la visibilidad en producci\u00f3n.\n\nImpacto: A los clientes no autenticados se les puede asignar una identidad principal, eludiendo potencialmente la autorizaci\u00f3n en entornos permisivos o mal configurados.\n\nMitigaci\u00f3n: Los usuarios deben actualizar a la versi\u00f3n 2.8.7 en la que las fallas de autenticaci\u00f3n TLS se manejan de manera \u2019fail-closed\u2019.\n\nLos usuarios que no puedan actualizar inmediatamente deben:\n- Habilitar la autenticaci\u00f3n obligatoria de certificado de cliente (nimbus.thrift.tls.client.auth.required: true)\n- Asegurar que las reglas de autorizaci\u00f3n denieguen expl\u00edcitamente el acceso a CN=ANONYMOUS\n- Revisar todas las configuraciones de ACL para detectar comportamientos impl\u00edcitos de \u2019permitir por defecto\u2019"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-41081",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-26T22:10:00.163",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 6.5,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 2.5,
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-41081",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-04-27T14:42:46.312578Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-04-27T14:16:48.167",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "tags": [
        "Mailing List",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/plxx5l29dvplk5rwzdcq53rdfl6v4gs8"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Mailing List",
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/25/3"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-287"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.