FKIE_CVE-2026-40859
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-06 09:16 - Updated: 2026-10-25 15:10| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| security@apache.org | https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-40859.html | Mitigation, Vendor Advisory | |
| af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108 | http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/05/3 | Mailing List, Third Party Advisory |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-http",
"product": "Apache Camel",
"vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.14.8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.0.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.18.3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.15.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.20.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.19.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security@apache.org"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:camel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "7662EB25-EAB6-493F-924C-5CA8A6F462B4",
"versionEndExcluding": "4.14.8",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.0.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:camel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "0AEE4159-4465-4ACD-B94A-1E4682C85270",
"versionEndExcluding": "4.18.3",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.15.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:camel:4.19.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "EDA4D206-8808-4D2A-873E-8488DD7E3E16",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.\n\nThe camel-vertx-http component deserializes HTTP response bodies carrying the Content-Type application/x-java-serialized-object using a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream, without applying any ObjectInputFilter (VertxHttpHelper.deserializeJavaObjectFromStream) This deserialization path is reached only when the producer endpoint is configured with transferException=true (or the component-level allowJavaSerializedObject=true) and throwExceptionOnFailure is left at its default value of true; in that case a backend HTTP response with a 5xx status and the application/x-java-serialized-object content type has its body deserialized with no class restrictions. An attacker who controls the backend the Camel producer talks to - through a man-in-the-middle position on an unencrypted (plain HTTP) connection, or by compromising the backend service - can return a crafted serialized Java object and, if a suitable gadget chain is present on the classpath, achieve remote code execution on the Camel application host. The path is not reachable in the default configuration, where transferException is false.\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.20.0.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 4.20.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, the deserialization performed by both helper utilities is constrained by a default ObjectInputFilter (allow-list java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*), which can be customised through the new deserializationFilter endpoint option or the JVM-wide -Djdk.serialFilter system property. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately: do not enable transferException=true (or allowJavaSerializedObject=true) on producers that talk to untrusted or network-reachable backends; ensure producer connections use TLS (https) so that a response cannot be substituted by a man-in-the-middle; and, where the option is required, set an explicit -Djdk.serialFilter allow-list (for example java.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*) to constrain deserialization."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Vulnerabilidad de deserializaci\u00f3n de datos no confiables en Apache Camel.\n\nEl componente camel-vertx-http deserializa los cuerpos de respuesta HTTP que llevan el Content-Type application/x-java-serialized-object usando un java.io.ObjectInputStream sin procesar, sin aplicar ning\u00fan ObjectInputFilter (VertxHttpHelper.deserializeJavaObjectFromStream). Esta ruta de deserializaci\u00f3n se alcanza solo cuando el endpoint del productor est\u00e1 configurado con transferException=true (o el allowJavaSerializedObject=true a nivel de componente) y throwExceptionOnFailure se deja en su valor predeterminado de true; en ese caso, una respuesta HTTP del backend con un estado 5xx y el tipo de contenido application/x-java-serialized-object tiene su cuerpo deserializado sin restricciones de clase. Un atacante que controla el backend con el que se comunica el productor de Camel - a trav\u00e9s de una posici\u00f3n de man-in-the-middle en una conexi\u00f3n no cifrada (HTTP simple), o comprometiendo el servicio de backend - puede devolver un objeto Java serializado manipulado y, si una cadena de gadgets adecuada est\u00e1 presente en el classpath, lograr la ejecuci\u00f3n remota de c\u00f3digo en el host de la aplicaci\u00f3n Camel. La ruta no es alcanzable en la configuraci\u00f3n predeterminada, donde transferException es false.\nEste problema afecta a Apache Camel: desde 4.0.0 antes de 4.14.8, desde 4.15.0 antes de 4.18.3, desde 4.19.0 antes de 4.20.0.\n\nSe recomienda a los usuarios actualizar a la versi\u00f3n 4.20.0, que corrige el problema. Si los usuarios est\u00e1n en la rama de versiones LTS 4.14.x, se sugiere que actualicen a 4.14.8. Si los usuarios est\u00e1n en la rama de versiones 4.18.x, se sugiere que actualicen a 4.18.3. Despu\u00e9s de la actualizaci\u00f3n, la deserializaci\u00f3n realizada por ambas utilidades auxiliares est\u00e1 restringida por un ObjectInputFilter predeterminado (lista de permitidos java.;javax.;org.apache.camel.**;!*), que puede personalizarse a trav\u00e9s de la nueva opci\u00f3n de endpoint deserializationFilter o la propiedad del sistema -Djdk.serialFilter a nivel de JVM. Para implementaciones que no pueden actualizarse inmediatamente: no habilite transferException=true (o allowJavaSerializedObject=true) en productores que se comunican con backends no confiables o accesibles por red; aseg\u00farese de que las conexiones del productor usen TLS (HTTPS) para que una respuesta no pueda ser sustituida por un man-in-the-middle; y, donde la opci\u00f3n sea requerida, establezca una lista de permitidos -Djdk.serialFilter expl\u00edcita (por ejemplo, java.;org.apache.camel.;!*) para restringir la deserializaci\u00f3n."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-40859",
"lastModified": "2026-10-25T15:10:00.147",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-40859",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-07-06T18:47:48.609198Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-07-06T09:16:35.520",
"references": [
{
"source": "security@apache.org",
"tags": [
"Mitigation",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-40859.html"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Mailing List",
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/05/3"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-502"
}
],
"source": "security@apache.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.