FKIE_CVE-2026-40242
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-04-10 21:16 - Updated: 2026-10-26 21:106.5 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "arcane",
"vendor": "getarcaneapp",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 1.17.3"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:getarcane:arcane:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "908A8D3F-26B0-4A9B-81F5-85D03CBF0E12",
"versionEndExcluding": "1.17.3",
"vulnerable": true
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"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to 1.17.3, the /api/templates/fetch endpoint accepts a caller-supplied url parameter and performs a server-side HTTP GET request to that URL without authentication and without URL scheme or host validation. The server\u0027s response is returned directly to the caller. type. This constitutes an unauthenticated SSRF vulnerability affecting any publicly reachable Arcane instance. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.17.3."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Arcane es una interfaz para gestionar contenedores Docker, im\u00e1genes, redes y vol\u00famenes. Anterior a la 1.17.3, el endpoint /API/templates/fetch acepta un par\u00e1metro url proporcionado por el llamador y realiza una solicitud HTTP GET del lado del servidor a esa URL sin autenticaci\u00f3n y sin validaci\u00f3n de esquema de URL o de host. La respuesta del servidor se devuelve directamente al llamador. tipo. Esto constituye una vulnerabilidad SSRF no autenticada que afecta a cualquier instancia de Arcane accesible p\u00fablicamente. Esta vulnerabilidad se corrige en la 1.17.3."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-40242",
"lastModified": "2026-10-26T21:10:00.170",
"metrics": {
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{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 7.2,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 2.7,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
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"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 6.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
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"impactScore": 2.5,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
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"ssvcV203": [
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"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
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"options": [
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"exploitation": "poc"
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{
"automatable": "yes"
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{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
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],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-04-13T20:54:32.958737Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
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}
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},
"published": "2026-04-10T21:16:27.747",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Release Notes"
],
"url": "https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/releases/tag/v1.17.3"
},
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"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
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"url": "https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/security/advisories/GHSA-ff24-4prj-gpmj"
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"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
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"description": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-918"
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],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.