FKIE_CVE-2026-40196
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-04-17 21:16 - Updated: 2026-10-26 22:10| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| sysadminsmedia | homebox | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "homebox",
"vendor": "sysadminsmedia",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 0.25.0"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
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"matchCriteriaId": "1F70CA15-79A0-4B2E-9B21-AD1B08FD5140",
"versionEndExcluding": "0.25.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
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"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "HomeBox is a home inventory and organization system. Versions prior to 0.25.0 contain a vulnerability where the defaultGroup ID remained permanently assigned to a user after being invited to a group, even after their access to that group was revoked. While the web interface correctly enforced the access revocation and prevented the user from viewing or modifying the group\u0027s contents, the API did not. Because the original group ID persisted as the user\u0027s defaultGroup, and this value was not properly validated when the X-Tenant header was omitted, the user could still perform full CRUD operations on the group\u0027s collections through the API, bypassing the intended access controls. This issue has been fixed in version 0.25.0."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "HomeBox es un sistema de inventario y organizaci\u00f3n del hogar. Las versiones anteriores a la 0.25.0 contienen una vulnerabilidad donde el ID de defaultGroup permanec\u00eda asignado permanentemente a un usuario despu\u00e9s de ser invitado a un grupo, incluso despu\u00e9s de que su acceso a ese grupo fuera revocado. Aunque la interfaz web aplicaba correctamente la revocaci\u00f3n del acceso e imped\u00eda al usuario ver o modificar el contenido del grupo, la API no lo hac\u00eda. Debido a que el ID del grupo original persist\u00eda como el defaultGroup del usuario, y este valor no se validaba correctamente cuando se omit\u00eda el encabezado X-Tenant, el usuario a\u00fan pod\u00eda realizar operaciones CRUD completas en las colecciones del grupo a trav\u00e9s de la API, eludiendo los controles de acceso previstos. Este problema ha sido solucionado en la versi\u00f3n 0.25.0."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-40196",
"lastModified": "2026-10-26T22:10:00.163",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 8.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.2,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
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],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-04-20T13:22:13.405894Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-04-17T21:16:33.863",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
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"Release Notes"
],
"url": "https://github.com/sysadminsmedia/homebox/releases/tag/v0.25.0"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
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],
"url": "https://github.com/sysadminsmedia/homebox/security/advisories/GHSA-6pvm-v73p-p6m9"
}
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"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-708"
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"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
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]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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