FKIE_CVE-2026-40193
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-04-16 00:16 - Updated: 2026-10-26 21:10| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| maddy_project | maddy | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "maddy",
"vendor": "foxcpp",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 0.9.3"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:maddy_project:maddy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "6F8403E8-747F-445C-9600-F61FBE0B2686",
"versionEndExcluding": "0.9.3",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "maddy is a composable, all-in-one mail server. Versions prior to 0.9.3 contain an LDAP injection vulnerability in the auth.ldap module where user-supplied usernames are interpolated into LDAP search filters and DN strings via strings.ReplaceAll() without any LDAP filter escaping, despite the go-ldap/ldap/v3 library\u0027s ldap.EscapeFilter() function being available in the same import. This affects three code paths: the Lookup() filter, the AuthPlain() DN template, and the AuthPlain() filter. An attacker with network access to the SMTP submission or IMAP interface can inject arbitrary LDAP filter expressions through the username field in AUTH PLAIN or LOGIN commands. This enables identity spoofing by manipulating filter results to authenticate as another user, LDAP directory enumeration via wildcard filters, and blind extraction of LDAP attribute values using authentication responses as a boolean oracle or via timing side-channels between the two distinct failure paths. This issue has been fixed in version 0.9.3."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "maddy es un servidor de correo componible, todo en uno. Las versiones anteriores a la 0.9.3 contienen una vulnerabilidad de inyecci\u00f3n LDAP en el m\u00f3dulo auth.ldap donde los nombres de usuario proporcionados por el usuario se interpolan en filtros de b\u00fasqueda LDAP y cadenas DN a trav\u00e9s de strings.ReplaceAll() sin ning\u00fan escape de filtro LDAP, a pesar de que la funci\u00f3n ldap.EscapeFilter() de la biblioteca go-ldap/ldap/v3 est\u00e1 disponible en la misma importaci\u00f3n. Esto afecta a tres rutas de c\u00f3digo: el filtro Lookup(), la plantilla DN de AuthPlain() y el filtro AuthPlain(). Un atacante con acceso de red a la interfaz de env\u00edo SMTP o IMAP puede inyectar expresiones de filtro LDAP arbitrarias a trav\u00e9s del campo de nombre de usuario en los comandos AUTH PLAIN o LOGIN. Esto permite la suplantaci\u00f3n de identidad manipulando los resultados del filtro para autenticarse como otro usuario, la enumeraci\u00f3n de directorios LDAP a trav\u00e9s de filtros comod\u00edn y la extracci\u00f3n ciega de valores de atributos LDAP utilizando las respuestas de autenticaci\u00f3n como un or\u00e1culo booleano o a trav\u00e9s de canales laterales de tiempo entre las dos rutas de fallo distintas. Este problema ha sido solucionado en la versi\u00f3n 0.9.3."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-40193",
"lastModified": "2026-10-26T21:10:00.170",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 8.2,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 4.2,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-40193",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-04-16T14:23:43.299676Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-04-16T00:16:28.163",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/foxcpp/maddy/commit/6a06337eb41fa87a35697366bcb71c3c962c44ba"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Product",
"Release Notes"
],
"url": "https://github.com/foxcpp/maddy/releases/tag/v0.9.3"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/foxcpp/maddy/security/advisories/GHSA-5835-4gvc-32pc"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-90"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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