FKIE_CVE-2026-40097
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-04-10 17:17 - Updated: 2026-10-26 22:10{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "certificates",
"vendor": "smallstep",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 0.24.0, \u003c 0.30.0-rc3"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:smallstep:step-ca:*:*:*:*:*:go:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "ABA8B83F-37DD-4755-AFB6-CD76AF8A4F4A",
"versionEndExcluding": "0.30.0",
"versionStartIncluding": "0.24.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:smallstep:step-ca:0.30.0:rc1:*:*:*:go:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "D49EF50A-2928-4577-A5AD-0CD81C9E1AE8",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:smallstep:step-ca:0.30.0:rc2:*:*:*:go:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "E238C89C-4A97-4FA1-8DE0-9FE51CDF59B9",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Step CA is an online certificate authority for secure, automated certificate management for DevOps. From 0.24.0 to before 0.30.0-rc3, an attacker can trigger an index out-of-bounds panic in Step CA by sending a crafted attestation key (AK) certificate with an empty Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension during TPM device attestation. When processing a device-attest-01 ACME challenge using TPM attestation, Step CA validates that the AK certificate contains the tcg-kp-AIKCertificate Extended Key Usage OID. During this validation, the EKU extension value is decoded from its ASN.1 representation and the first element is checked. A crafted certificate could include an EKU extension that decodes to an empty sequence, causing the code to panic when accessing the first element of the empty slice. This vulnerability is only reachable when a device-attest-01 ACME challenge with TPM attestation is configured. Deployments not using TPM device attestation are not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.30.0-rc3."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Step CA es una autoridad de certificaci\u00f3n en l\u00ednea para la gesti\u00f3n segura y automatizada de certificados para DevOps. Desde la versi\u00f3n 0.24.0 hasta antes de la 0.30.0-rc3, un atacante puede desencadenar un p\u00e1nico por \u00edndice fuera de l\u00edmites en Step CA al enviar un certificado de clave de atestaci\u00f3n (AK) manipulado con una extensi\u00f3n de Uso Extendido de Clave (EKU) vac\u00eda durante la atestaci\u00f3n de dispositivo TPM. Al procesar un desaf\u00edo ACME device-attest-01 utilizando la atestaci\u00f3n TPM, Step CA valida que el certificado AK contenga el OID de Uso Extendido de Clave tcg-kp-AIKCertificate. Durante esta validaci\u00f3n, el valor de la extensi\u00f3n EKU se decodifica de su representaci\u00f3n ASN.1 y se verifica el primer elemento. Un certificado manipulado podr\u00eda incluir una extensi\u00f3n EKU que se decodifica a una secuencia vac\u00eda, causando que el c\u00f3digo entre en p\u00e1nico al acceder al primer elemento del slice vac\u00edo. Esta vulnerabilidad solo es alcanzable cuando se configura un desaf\u00edo ACME device-attest-01 con atestaci\u00f3n TPM. Las implementaciones que no utilizan la atestaci\u00f3n de dispositivo TPM no se ven afectadas. Esta vulnerabilidad est\u00e1 corregida en la versi\u00f3n 0.30.0-rc3."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-40097",
"lastModified": "2026-10-26T22:10:00.163",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseScore": 3.7,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-40097",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-04-10T18:30:05.878982Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-04-10T17:17:12.823",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/smallstep/certificates/commit/ffd31ac0a87e03b0224cb8363094bfe602242888"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Issue Tracking",
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/smallstep/certificates/pull/2569"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Product",
"Release Notes"
],
"url": "https://github.com/smallstep/certificates/releases/tag/v0.30.0"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Mitigation",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/smallstep/certificates/security/advisories/GHSA-9qq8-cgcv-qmc9"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-129"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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