FKIE_CVE-2026-35412
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-04-06 22:16 - Updated: 2026-07-24 21:108.1 (High) - CVSS:3.1/
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "directus",
"vendor": "directus",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 11.16.1"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:monospace:directus:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "E86A8769-F082-4253-9D48-B6B484CA61FF",
"versionEndExcluding": "11.16.1",
"vulnerable": true
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],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Directus is a real-time API and App dashboard for managing SQL database content. Prior to 11.16.1, Directus\u0027 TUS resumable upload endpoint (/files/tus) allows any authenticated user with basic file upload permissions to overwrite arbitrary existing files by UUID. The TUS controller performs only collection-level authorization checks, verifying the user has some permission on directus_files, but never validates item-level access to the specific file being replaced. As a result, row-level permission rules (e.g., \"users can only update their own files\") are completely bypassed via the TUS path while being correctly enforced on the standard REST upload path. This vulnerability is fixed in 11.16.1."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Directus es una API en tiempo real y un panel de control de aplicaciones para gestionar contenido de bases de datos SQL. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 11.16.1, el endpoint de carga reanudable TUS de Directus (/files/tus) permite a cualquier usuario autenticado con permisos b\u00e1sicos de carga de archivos sobrescribir archivos existentes arbitrarios por UUID. El controlador TUS realiza solo comprobaciones de autorizaci\u00f3n a nivel de colecci\u00f3n, verificando que el usuario tiene alg\u00fan permiso en directus_files, pero nunca valida el acceso a nivel de \u00edtem al archivo espec\u00edfico que se est\u00e1 reemplazando. Como resultado, las reglas de permiso a nivel de fila (por ejemplo, \u0027los usuarios solo pueden actualizar sus propios archivos\u0027) son completamente eludidas a trav\u00e9s de la ruta TUS mientras que se aplican correctamente en la ruta de carga REST est\u00e1ndar. Esta vulnerabilidad est\u00e1 corregida en la versi\u00f3n 11.16.1."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-35412",
"lastModified": "2026-07-24T21:10:00.143",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
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"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseScore": 7.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
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"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
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"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
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"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.2,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
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"ssvcV203": [
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"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-35412",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
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{
"automatable": "no"
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{
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],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-04-07T16:23:08.777389Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
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"published": "2026-04-06T22:16:22.397",
"references": [
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"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
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],
"url": "https://github.com/directus/directus/security/advisories/GHSA-qqmv-5p3g-px89"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
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"value": "CWE-863"
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"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
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]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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