FKIE_CVE-2026-34377
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-03-31 15:16 - Updated: 2026-07-24 21:10
Severity
Summary
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.0 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.1, a logic error in Zebra's transaction verification cache could allow a malicious miner to induce a consensus split. By matching a valid transaction's txid while providing invalid authorization data, a miner could cause vulnerable Zebra nodes to accept an invalid block, leading to a consensus split from the rest of the Zcash network. This would not allow invalid transactions to be accepted but could result in a consensus split between vulnerable Zebra nodes and invulnerable Zebra and Zcashd nodes. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.3.0 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.1.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| zfnd | zebra | * | |
| zfnd | zebra-consensus | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "zebra",
"vendor": "ZcashFoundation",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 4.3.0"
}
]
},
{
"product": "zebra-consensus",
"vendor": "ZcashFoundation",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 5.0.1"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:zfnd:zebra:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "4B93957D-63A6-4232-8046-FDF593752C05",
"versionEndExcluding": "4.3.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:zfnd:zebra-consensus:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "D958D1C3-B1F2-48EE-A41C-777DE3C0A8B1",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.0.1",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.0 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.1, a logic error in Zebra\u0027s transaction verification cache could allow a malicious miner to induce a consensus split. By matching a valid transaction\u0027s txid while providing invalid authorization data, a miner could cause vulnerable Zebra nodes to accept an invalid block, leading to a consensus split from the rest of the Zcash network. This would not allow invalid transactions to be accepted but could result in a consensus split between vulnerable Zebra nodes and invulnerable Zebra and Zcashd nodes. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.3.0 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.1."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "ZEBRA es un nodo Zcash escrito completamente en Rust. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 4.3.0 de zebrad y la versi\u00f3n 5.0.1 de zebra-consensus, un error l\u00f3gico en la cach\u00e9 de verificaci\u00f3n de transacciones de Zebra podr\u00eda permitir a un minero malicioso inducir una divisi\u00f3n de consenso. Al hacer coincidir el txid de una transacci\u00f3n v\u00e1lida mientras se proporcionan datos de autorizaci\u00f3n inv\u00e1lidos, un minero podr\u00eda hacer que los nodos Zebra vulnerables aceptaran un bloque inv\u00e1lido, lo que llevar\u00eda a una divisi\u00f3n de consenso del resto de la red Zcash. Esto no permitir\u00eda que se aceptaran transacciones inv\u00e1lidas, pero podr\u00eda resultar en una divisi\u00f3n de consenso entre nodos Zebra vulnerables y nodos Zebra y Zcashd invulnerables. Este problema ha sido parcheado en la versi\u00f3n 4.3.0 de zebrad y la versi\u00f3n 5.0.1 de zebra-consensus."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-34377",
"lastModified": "2026-07-24T21:10:00.143",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.2,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 8.4,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-34377",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-03-31T17:18:05.262524Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-03-31T15:16:19.233",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Release Notes"
],
"url": "https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/releases/tag/v4.3.0"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-3vmh-33xr-9cqh"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://zfnd.org/zebra-4-3-0-critical-security-fixes-zip-235-support-and-performance-improvements"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-347"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
Loading…
Loading…
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Loading…
Loading…