FKIE_CVE-2026-33687
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-03-26 22:16 - Updated: 2026-06-17 10:37{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "sharp",
"vendor": "code16",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 9.20.0"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:code16:sharp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "0D710527-04D5-4152-A28C-506356B95CE1",
"versionEndExcluding": "9.20.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
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"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
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],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Sharp is a content management framework built for Laravel as a package. Versions prior to 9.20.0 contain a vulnerability in the file upload endpoint that allows authenticated users to bypass all file type restrictions. The upload endpoint within the `ApiFormUploadController` accepts a client-controlled `validation_rule` parameter. This parameter is directly passed into the Laravel validator without sufficient server-side enforcement. By intercepting the request and sending `validation_rule[]=file`, an attacker can completely bypass all MIME type and file extension restrictions. This issue has been addressed in version 9.20.0 by removing the client-controlled validation rules and strictly defining upload rules server-side. As a workaround, ensure that the storage disk used for Sharp uploads is strictly private. Under default configurations, an attacker cannot directly execute uploaded PHP files unless a public disk configuration is explicitly used."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Sharp es un framework de gesti\u00f3n de contenido construido para Laravel como un paquete. Las versiones anteriores a la 9.20.0 contienen una vulnerabilidad en el endpoint de carga de archivos que permite a los usuarios autenticados eludir todas las restricciones de tipo de archivo. El endpoint de carga dentro del `ApiFormUploadController` acepta un par\u00e1metro `validation_rule` controlado por el cliente. Este par\u00e1metro se pasa directamente al validador de Laravel sin una aplicaci\u00f3n suficiente por parte del servidor. Al interceptar la solicitud y enviar `validation_rule[]=file`, un atacante puede eludir completamente todas las restricciones de tipo MIME y de extensi\u00f3n de archivo. Este problema se ha abordado en la versi\u00f3n 9.20.0 eliminando las reglas de validaci\u00f3n controladas por el cliente y definiendo estrictamente las reglas de carga en el lado del servidor. Como soluci\u00f3n alternativa, aseg\u00farese de que el disco de almacenamiento utilizado para las cargas de Sharp sea estrictamente privado. Bajo las configuraciones predeterminadas, un atacante no puede ejecutar directamente archivos PHP cargados a menos que se utilice expl\u00edcitamente una configuraci\u00f3n de disco p\u00fablico."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-33687",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:37:55.620",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-33687",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-03-27T20:28:24.566534Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-03-26T22:16:31.203",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Issue Tracking",
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/code16/sharp/pull/714"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Product"
],
"url": "https://github.com/code16/sharp/releases/tag/v9.20.0"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/code16/sharp/security/advisories/GHSA-fr76-5637-w3g9"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://laravel.com/docs/13.x/filesystem"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-434"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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