FKIE_CVE-2026-33620

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-03-26 21:17 - Updated: 2026-06-17 10:37
Severity
4.3 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
4.3 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Summary
PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.7.8` through `v0.8.3` accepted the API token from a `token` URL query parameter in addition to the `Authorization` header. When a valid API credential is sent in the URL, it can be exposed through request URIs recorded by intermediaries or client-side tooling, such as reverse proxy access logs, browser history, shell history, clipboard history, and tracing systems that capture full URLs. This issue is an unsafe credential transport pattern rather than a direct authentication bypass. It only affects deployments where a token is configured and a client actually uses the query-parameter form. PinchTab's security guidance already recommended `Authorization: Bearer <token>`, but `v0.8.3` still accepted `?token=` and included first-party flows that generated and consumed URLs containing the token. This was addressed in v0.8.4 by removing query-string token authentication and requiring safer header- or session-based authentication flows.
References
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/releases/tag/v0.8.4Product, Release Notes
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/security/advisories/GHSA-mrqc-3276-74f8Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/security/advisories/GHSA-mrqc-3276-74f8Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
pinchtab pinchtab *
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "pinchtab",
          "vendor": "pinchtab",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 0.7.8, \u003c 0.8.4"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:pinchtab:pinchtab:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "63622A95-2D68-404C-9E53-A6D65A4E8629",
              "versionEndExcluding": "0.8.4",
              "versionStartIncluding": "0.7.8",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.7.8` through `v0.8.3` accepted the API token from a `token` URL query parameter in addition to the `Authorization` header. When a valid API credential is sent in the URL, it can be exposed through request URIs recorded by intermediaries or client-side tooling, such as reverse proxy access logs, browser history, shell history, clipboard history, and tracing systems that capture full URLs. This issue is an unsafe credential transport pattern rather than a direct authentication bypass. It only affects deployments where a token is configured and a client actually uses the query-parameter form. PinchTab\u0027s security guidance already recommended `Authorization: Bearer \u003ctoken\u003e`, but `v0.8.3` still accepted `?token=` and included first-party flows that generated and consumed URLs containing the token. This was addressed in v0.8.4 by removing query-string token authentication and requiring safer header- or session-based authentication flows."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "PinchTab es un servidor HTTP independiente que otorga a los agentes de IA control directo sobre un navegador Chrome. PinchTab \u0027v0.7.8\u0027 hasta \u0027v0.8.3\u0027 aceptaba el token de la API de un par\u00e1metro de consulta URL \u0027token\u0027 adem\u00e1s del encabezado \u0027Authorization\u0027. Cuando una credencial de API v\u00e1lida se env\u00eda en la URL, puede ser expuesta a trav\u00e9s de URIs de solicitud registradas por intermediarios o herramientas del lado del cliente, como registros de acceso de proxy inverso, historial del navegador, historial de shell, historial del portapapeles y sistemas de rastreo que capturan URLs completas. Este problema es un patr\u00f3n de transporte de credenciales inseguro en lugar de una omisi\u00f3n de autenticaci\u00f3n directa. Solo afecta a las implementaciones donde se configura un token y un cliente realmente utiliza la forma de par\u00e1metro de consulta. La gu\u00eda de seguridad de PinchTab ya recomendaba \u0027Authorization: Bearer \u0027, pero \u0027v0.8.3\u0027 a\u00fan aceptaba \u0027?token=\u0027 e inclu\u00eda flujos de primera parte que generaban y consum\u00edan URLs que conten\u00edan el token. Esto se abord\u00f3 en v0.8.4 al eliminar la autenticaci\u00f3n de token en la cadena de consulta y al requerir flujos de autenticaci\u00f3n m\u00e1s seguros basados en encabezados o en la sesi\u00f3n."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-33620",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:37:47.880",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 4.3,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 1.4,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      },
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 4.3,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 1.4,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-33620",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-03-30T14:43:41.545447Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-03-26T21:17:06.410",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Product",
        "Release Notes"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/releases/tag/v0.8.4"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/security/advisories/GHSA-mrqc-3276-74f8"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/security/advisories/GHSA-mrqc-3276-74f8"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-598"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.