FKIE_CVE-2026-31711
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-01 14:16 - Updated: 2026-11-11 21:10| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.2 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.2 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.2 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.2 |
{
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{
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{
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"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
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{
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"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.15.210",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.15.91",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.1.175",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.1.9",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.2"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.2",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.210",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.175",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.136",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.84",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.25",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.0.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.0.2",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
},
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unknown",
"product": "SIMATIC S7-1500 TM MFP - GNU/Linux subsystem",
"vendor": "Siemens",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"source": "0b142b55-0307-4c5a-b3c9-f314f3fb7c5e"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
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],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: server: fix active_num_conn leak on transport allocation failure\n\nCommit 77ffbcac4e56 (\"smb: server: fix leak of active_num_conn in\nksmbd_tcp_new_connection()\") addressed the kthread_run() failure\npath. The earlier alloc_transport() == NULL path in the same\nfunction has the same leak, is reachable pre-authentication via any\nTCP connect to port 445, and was empirically reproduced on UML\n(ARCH=um, v7.0-rc7): a small number of forced allocation failures\nwere sufficient to put ksmbd into a state where every subsequent\nconnection attempt was rejected for the remainder of the boot.\n\nksmbd_kthread_fn() increments active_num_conn before calling\nksmbd_tcp_new_connection() and discards the return value, so when\nalloc_transport() returns NULL the socket is released and -ENOMEM\nreturned without decrementing the counter. Each such failure\npermanently consumes one slot from the max_connections pool; once\ncumulative failures reach the cap, atomic_inc_return() hits the\nthreshold on every subsequent accept and every new connection is\nrejected. The counter is only reset by module reload.\n\nAn unauthenticated remote attacker can drive the server toward the\nmemory pressure that makes alloc_transport() fail by holding open\nconnections with large RFC1002 lengths up to MAX_STREAM_PROT_LEN\n(0x00FFFFFF); natural transient allocation failures on a loaded\nhost produce the same drift more slowly.\n\nMirror the existing rollback pattern in ksmbd_kthread_fn(): on the\nalloc_transport() failure path, decrement active_num_conn gated on\nserver_conf.max_connections.\n\nRepro details: with the patch reverted, forced alloc_transport()\nNULL returns leaked counter slots and subsequent connection\nattempts -- including legitimate connects issued after the\nforced-fail window had closed -- were all rejected with \"Limit the\nmaximum number of connections\". With this patch applied, the same\nconnect sequence produces no rejections and the counter cycles\ncleanly between zero and one on every accept."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\nsmb: servidor: corrige la fuga de active_num_conn en el fallo de asignaci\u00f3n de transporte\n\nEl commit 77ffbcac4e56 (\u2019smb: servidor: corrige la fuga de active_num_conn en ksmbd_tcp_new_connection()\u2019) abord\u00f3 la ruta de fallo de kthread_run(). La ruta anterior alloc_transport() == NULL en la misma funci\u00f3n tiene la misma fuga, es alcanzable pre-autenticaci\u00f3n a trav\u00e9s de cualquier conexi\u00f3n TCP al puerto 445, y fue reproducida emp\u00edricamente en UML (ARCH=um, v7.0-rc7): un peque\u00f1o n\u00famero de fallos de asignaci\u00f3n forzados fueron suficientes para poner a ksmbd en un estado donde cada intento de conexi\u00f3n subsiguiente fue rechazado por el resto del arranque.\n\nksmbd_kthread_fn() incrementa active_num_conn antes de llamar a ksmbd_tcp_new_connection() y descarta el valor de retorno, as\u00ed que cuando alloc_transport() devuelve NULL el socket es liberado y -ENOMEM es devuelto sin decrementar el contador. Cada fallo de este tipo consume permanentemente una ranura del pool de max_connections; una vez que los fallos acumulativos alcanzan el l\u00edmite, atomic_inc_return() alcanza el umbral en cada aceptaci\u00f3n subsiguiente y cada nueva conexi\u00f3n es rechazada. El contador solo se reinicia al recargar el m\u00f3dulo.\n\nUn atacante remoto no autenticado puede llevar al servidor hacia la presi\u00f3n de memoria que hace que alloc_transport() falle manteniendo conexiones abiertas con grandes longitudes RFC1002 hasta MAX_STREAM_PROT_LEN (0x 00FFFFFF); los fallos de asignaci\u00f3n transitorios naturales en un host cargado producen la misma deriva m\u00e1s lentamente.\n\nRefleja el patr\u00f3n de reversi\u00f3n existente en ksmbd_kthread_fn(): en la ruta de fallo de alloc_transport(), decrementa active_num_conn limitado por server_conf.max_connections.\n\nDetalles de reproducci\u00f3n: con el parche revertido, los retornos NULL forzados de alloc_transport() filtraron ranuras de contador y los intentos de conexi\u00f3n subsiguientes --incluyendo conexiones leg\u00edtimas emitidas despu\u00e9s de que la ventana de fallo forzado se hab\u00eda cerrado-- fueron todos rechazados con \u2019Limite el n\u00famero m\u00e1ximo de conexiones\u2019. Con este parche aplicado, la misma secuencia de conexi\u00f3n no produce rechazos y el contador cicla limpiamente entre cero y uno en cada aceptaci\u00f3n."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-31711",
"lastModified": "2026-11-11T21:10:00.200",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-05-01T14:16:21.150",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
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],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/283027aa93380380a0994f35dde3ec95318f2654"
},
{
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},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
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{
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{
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{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc2e7d595d68cf1be1ba64e3d30ebf3266bf7242"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
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},
{
"source": "0b142b55-0307-4c5a-b3c9-f314f3fb7c5e",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-784472.html"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-401"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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