FKIE_CVE-2026-31635
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-04-24 15:16 - Updated: 2026-11-11 23:10| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.16 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.0 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.0 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.0 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.0 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.0 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.0 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.0 |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/rxrpc/rxgk.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "beee051f259acd286fed64c32c2b31e6f5097eb5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9d1d2b59341f58126a69b51f9f5f8ccb9f12e54a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "e2f1a80d8b1ed6a5ae585a399c2b46500bdcc305",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9d1d2b59341f58126a69b51f9f5f8ccb9f12e54a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "a2567217ade970ecc458144b6be469bc015b23e5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9d1d2b59341f58126a69b51f9f5f8ccb9f12e54a",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/rxrpc/rxgk.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.16"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.16",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.23",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.19.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.19.13",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.0",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "EAE31F43-AAC5-4801-B2B2-119D62A532A2",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.23",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.16.1",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "1490EF9B-9080-481C-8D22-1306AAE664E4",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.19.13",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.19",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.16:-:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "6238B17D-C12B-458F-A138-97039BFC4595",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "F253B622-8837-4245-BCE5-A7BF8FC76A16",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "4AE85AD8-4641-4E7C-A2F4-305E2CD9EE64",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "F666C8D8-6538-46D4-B318-87610DE64C34",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "02259FDA-961B-47BC-AE7F-93D7EC6E90C2",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "58A9FEFF-C040-420D-8F0A-BFDAAA1DF258",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "1D2315C0-D46F-4F85-9754-F9E5E11374A6",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "512EE3A8-A590-4501-9A94-5D4B268D6138",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nrxrpc: fix oversized RESPONSE authenticator length check\n\nrxgk_verify_response() decodes auth_len from the packet and is supposed\nto verify that it fits in the remaining bytes. The existing check is\ninverted, so oversized RESPONSE authenticators are accepted and passed\nto rxgk_decrypt_skb(), which can later reach skb_to_sgvec() with an\nimpossible length and hit BUG_ON(len).\n\nDecoded from the original latest-net reproduction logs with\nscripts/decode_stacktrace.sh:\n\nRIP: __skb_to_sgvec()\n [net/core/skbuff.c:5285 (discriminator 1)]\nCall Trace:\n skb_to_sgvec() [net/core/skbuff.c:5305]\n rxgk_decrypt_skb() [net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h:81]\n rxgk_verify_response() [net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1268]\n rxrpc_process_connection()\n [net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:266 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:364\n net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:386]\n process_one_work() [kernel/workqueue.c:3281]\n worker_thread()\n [kernel/workqueue.c:3353 kernel/workqueue.c:3440]\n kthread() [kernel/kthread.c:436]\n ret_from_fork() [arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164]\n\nReject authenticator lengths that exceed the remaining packet payload."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\nrxrpc: correcci\u00f3n de la comprobaci\u00f3n de longitud de autenticador RESPONSE sobredimensionado\n\nrxgk_verify_response() decodifica auth_len del paquete y se supone que verifica que cabe en los bytes restantes. La comprobaci\u00f3n existente est\u00e1 invertida, por lo que los autenticadores RESPONSE sobredimensionados son aceptados y pasados a rxgk_decrypt_skb(), lo que puede llegar m\u00e1s tarde a skb_to_sgvec() con una longitud imposible y activar BUG_ON(len).\n\nDecodificado de los registros de reproducci\u00f3n latest-net originales con scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh:\n\nRIP: __skb_to_sgvec()\n [net/core/skbuff.c:5285 (discriminador 1)]\nTraza de Llamadas:\n skb_to_sgvec() [net/core/skbuff.c:5305]\n rxgk_decrypt_skb() [net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h:81]\n rxgk_verify_response() [net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1268]\n rxrpc_process_connection()\n [net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:266 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:364\n net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:386]\n process_one_work() [kernel/workqueue.c:3281]\n worker_thread()\n [kernel/workqueue.c:3353 kernel/workqueue.c:3440]\n kthread() [kernel/kthread.c:436]\n ret_from_fork() [arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164]\n\nRechazar longitudes de autenticador que excedan la carga \u00fatil restante del paquete."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-31635",
"lastModified": "2026-11-11T23:10:00.263",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-31635",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-05-18T00:00:00+00:00",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-04-24T15:16:42.820",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a2567217ade970ecc458144b6be469bc015b23e5"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/beee051f259acd286fed64c32c2b31e6f5097eb5"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2f1a80d8b1ed6a5ae585a399c2b46500bdcc305"
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"url": "https://github.com/v12-security/pocs/tree/main/dirtydecrypt"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "NVD-CWE-noinfo"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
},
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-130"
}
],
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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