FKIE_CVE-2026-31576

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-04-24 15:16 - Updated: 2026-04-24 17:51
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: hackrf: fix to not free memory after the device is registered in hackrf_probe() In hackrf driver, the following race condition occurs: ``` CPU0 CPU1 hackrf_probe() kzalloc(); // alloc hackrf_dev .... v4l2_device_register(); .... fd = sys_open("/path/to/dev"); // open hackrf fd .... v4l2_device_unregister(); .... kfree(); // free hackrf_dev .... sys_ioctl(fd, ...); v4l2_ioctl(); video_is_registered() // UAF!! .... sys_close(fd); v4l2_release() // UAF!! hackrf_video_release() kfree(); // DFB!! ``` When a V4L2 or video device is unregistered, the device node is removed so new open() calls are blocked. However, file descriptors that are already open-and any in-flight I/O-do not terminate immediately; they remain valid until the last reference is dropped and the driver's release() is invoked. Therefore, freeing device memory on the error path after hackrf_probe() has registered dev it will lead to a race to use-after-free vuln, since those already-open handles haven't been released yet. And since release() free memory too, race to use-after-free and double-free vuln occur. To prevent this, if device is registered from probe(), it should be modified to free memory only through release() rather than calling kfree() directly.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07e9e674b6146b1f6fc41b1f54b8968bf2802824
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2145c71a8044362e82e9923f001ba2aeb771b848
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/98a0a81ce78020c2522e0046f49d200de9778cb9
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fcd1d70792a35c8a97414fe429f48311e41269c2
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
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{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmedia: hackrf: fix to not free memory after the device is registered in hackrf_probe()\n\nIn hackrf driver, the following race condition occurs:\n```\n\t\tCPU0\t\t\t\t\t\tCPU1\nhackrf_probe()\n  kzalloc(); // alloc hackrf_dev\n  ....\n  v4l2_device_register();\n  ....\n\t\t\t\t\t\tfd = sys_open(\"/path/to/dev\"); // open hackrf fd\n\t\t\t\t\t\t....\n  v4l2_device_unregister();\n  ....\n  kfree(); // free hackrf_dev\n  ....\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsys_ioctl(fd, ...);\n\t\t\t\t\t\t  v4l2_ioctl();\n\t\t\t\t\t\t    video_is_registered() // UAF!!\n\t\t\t\t\t\t....\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsys_close(fd);\n\t\t\t\t\t\t  v4l2_release() // UAF!!\n\t\t\t\t\t\t    hackrf_video_release()\n\t\t\t\t\t\t      kfree(); // DFB!!\n```\n\nWhen a V4L2 or video device is unregistered, the device node is removed so\nnew open() calls are blocked.\n\nHowever, file descriptors that are already open-and any in-flight I/O-do\nnot terminate immediately; they remain valid until the last reference is\ndropped and the driver\u0027s release() is invoked.\n\nTherefore, freeing device memory on the error path after hackrf_probe()\nhas registered dev it will lead to a race to use-after-free vuln, since\nthose already-open handles haven\u0027t been released yet.\n\nAnd since release() free memory too, race to use-after-free and\ndouble-free vuln occur.\n\nTo prevent this, if device is registered from probe(), it should be\nmodified to free memory only through release() rather than calling\nkfree() directly."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-31576",
  "lastModified": "2026-04-24T17:51:40.810",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-04-24T15:16:32.230",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07e9e674b6146b1f6fc41b1f54b8968bf2802824"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2145c71a8044362e82e9923f001ba2aeb771b848"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/98a0a81ce78020c2522e0046f49d200de9778cb9"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fcd1d70792a35c8a97414fe429f48311e41269c2"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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