FKIE_CVE-2026-31533
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-04-23 18:16 - Updated: 2026-04-24 14:38
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/tls: fix use-after-free in -EBUSY error path of tls_do_encryption
The -EBUSY handling in tls_do_encryption(), introduced by commit
859054147318 ("net: tls: handle backlogging of crypto requests"), has
a use-after-free due to double cleanup of encrypt_pending and the
scatterlist entry.
When crypto_aead_encrypt() returns -EBUSY, the request is enqueued to
the cryptd backlog and the async callback tls_encrypt_done() will be
invoked upon completion. That callback unconditionally restores the
scatterlist entry (sge->offset, sge->length) and decrements
ctx->encrypt_pending. However, if tls_encrypt_async_wait() returns an
error, the synchronous error path in tls_do_encryption() performs the
same cleanup again, double-decrementing encrypt_pending and
double-restoring the scatterlist.
The double-decrement corrupts the encrypt_pending sentinel (initialized
to 1), making tls_encrypt_async_wait() permanently skip the wait for
pending async callbacks. A subsequent sendmsg can then free the
tls_rec via bpf_exec_tx_verdict() while a cryptd callback is still
pending, resulting in a use-after-free when the callback fires on the
freed record.
Fix this by skipping the synchronous cleanup when the -EBUSY async
wait returns an error, since the callback has already handled
encrypt_pending and sge restoration.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/tls: fix use-after-free in -EBUSY error path of tls_do_encryption\n\nThe -EBUSY handling in tls_do_encryption(), introduced by commit\n859054147318 (\"net: tls: handle backlogging of crypto requests\"), has\na use-after-free due to double cleanup of encrypt_pending and the\nscatterlist entry.\n\nWhen crypto_aead_encrypt() returns -EBUSY, the request is enqueued to\nthe cryptd backlog and the async callback tls_encrypt_done() will be\ninvoked upon completion. That callback unconditionally restores the\nscatterlist entry (sge-\u003eoffset, sge-\u003elength) and decrements\nctx-\u003eencrypt_pending. However, if tls_encrypt_async_wait() returns an\nerror, the synchronous error path in tls_do_encryption() performs the\nsame cleanup again, double-decrementing encrypt_pending and\ndouble-restoring the scatterlist.\n\nThe double-decrement corrupts the encrypt_pending sentinel (initialized\nto 1), making tls_encrypt_async_wait() permanently skip the wait for\npending async callbacks. A subsequent sendmsg can then free the\ntls_rec via bpf_exec_tx_verdict() while a cryptd callback is still\npending, resulting in a use-after-free when the callback fires on the\nfreed record.\n\nFix this by skipping the synchronous cleanup when the -EBUSY async\nwait returns an error, since the callback has already handled\nencrypt_pending and sge restoration."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-31533",
"lastModified": "2026-04-24T14:38:44.020",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-04-23T18:16:26.857",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02f3ecadb23558bbe068e6504118f1b712d4ece0"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0e43e0a3c94044acc74b8e0927c27972eb5a59e8"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2694d408b0e595024e0fc1d64ff9db0358580f74"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/414fc5e5a5aff776c150f1b86770e0a25a35df3a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5d70eb25b41e9b010828cd12818b06a0c3b04412"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a9b8b18364fffce4c451e6f6fd218fa4ab646705"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa9facde6c5005205874c37db3fd25799d741baf"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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