FKIE_CVE-2026-31471
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-04-22 14:16 - Updated: 2026-11-11 23:10| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.0 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.0 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.0 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.0 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.0 |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "371a43c4ac70cac0de9f9b1fc5b1660b9565b9f1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6be02e3e4f376fea468846c8562655ca5ee18204",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5784a1e2889c9525a8f036cb586930e232170bf7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6be02e3e4f376fea468846c8562655ca5ee18204",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "d849a2f7309fc0616e79d13b008b0a47e0458b6e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6be02e3e4f376fea468846c8562655ca5ee18204",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.14"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.14",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.21",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.19.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.19.11",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.0",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "A92793EC-8117-409C-996C-47A04124C722",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.21",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.14",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "4CA2E747-A9EC-4518-9AA2-B4247FC748B7",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.19.11",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.19",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "F253B622-8837-4245-BCE5-A7BF8FC76A16",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "4AE85AD8-4641-4E7C-A2F4-305E2CD9EE64",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "F666C8D8-6538-46D4-B318-87610DE64C34",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "02259FDA-961B-47BC-AE7F-93D7EC6E90C2",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "58A9FEFF-C040-420D-8F0A-BFDAAA1DF258",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxfrm: iptfs: only publish mode_data after clone setup\n\niptfs_clone_state() stores x-\u003emode_data before allocating the reorder\nwindow. If that allocation fails, the code frees the cloned state and\nreturns -ENOMEM, leaving x-\u003emode_data pointing at freed memory.\n\nThe xfrm clone unwind later runs destroy_state() through x-\u003emode_data,\nso the failed clone path tears down IPTFS state that clone_state()\nalready freed.\n\nKeep the cloned IPTFS state private until all allocations succeed so\nfailed clones leave x-\u003emode_data unset. The destroy path already\nhandles a NULL mode_data pointer."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\nxfrm: iptfs: solo publicar mode_data despu\u00e9s de configurar el clon\n\niptfs_clone_state() almacena x -\u003e mode_data antes de asignar la ventana de reordenamiento. Si esa asignaci\u00f3n falla, el c\u00f3digo libera el estado clonado y devuelve -ENOMEM, dejando x -\u003e mode_data apuntando a memoria liberada.\n\nEl desenrollado del clon xfrm m\u00e1s tarde ejecuta destroy_state() a trav\u00e9s de x -\u003e mode_data, por lo que la ruta de clonaci\u00f3n fallida desmantela el estado IPTFS que clone_state() ya liber\u00f3.\n\nMantener el estado IPTFS clonado privado hasta que todas las asignaciones tengan \u00e9xito para que los clones fallidos dejen x -\u003e mode_data sin establecer. La ruta de destrucci\u00f3n ya maneja un puntero mode_data NULL."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-31471",
"lastModified": "2026-11-11T23:10:00.263",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-04-22T14:16:43.610",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/371a43c4ac70cac0de9f9b1fc5b1660b9565b9f1"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5784a1e2889c9525a8f036cb586930e232170bf7"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d849a2f7309fc0616e79d13b008b0a47e0458b6e"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-415"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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