FKIE_CVE-2026-30867
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-04-02 14:16 - Updated: 2026-10-26 22:10
Severity
5.7 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
6.5 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
6.5 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/
Summary
CocoaMQTT is a MQTT 5.0 client library for iOS and macOS written in Swift. Prior to version 2.2.2, a vulnerability exists in the packet parsing logic of CocoaMQTT that allows an attacker (or a compromised/malicious MQTT broker) to remotely crash the host iOS/macOS/tvOS application. If an attacker publishes the 4-byte malformed payload to a shared topic with the RETAIN flag set to true, the MQTT broker will persist the payload. Any time a vulnerable client connects and subscribes to that topic, the broker will automatically push the malformed packet. The app will instantly crash in the background before the user can even interact with it. This effectively "bricks" the mobile application (a persistent DoS) until the retained message is manually wiped from the broker database. This issue has been patched in version 2.2.2.
References
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "CocoaMQTT",
"vendor": "emqx",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 2.2.2"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
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"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CocoaMQTT is a MQTT 5.0 client library for iOS and macOS written in Swift. Prior to version 2.2.2, a vulnerability exists in the packet parsing logic of CocoaMQTT that allows an attacker (or a compromised/malicious MQTT broker) to remotely crash the host iOS/macOS/tvOS application. If an attacker publishes the 4-byte malformed payload to a shared topic with the RETAIN flag set to true, the MQTT broker will persist the payload. Any time a vulnerable client connects and subscribes to that topic, the broker will automatically push the malformed packet. The app will instantly crash in the background before the user can even interact with it. This effectively \"bricks\" the mobile application (a persistent DoS) until the retained message is manually wiped from the broker database. This issue has been patched in version 2.2.2."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "CocoaMQTT es una biblioteca cliente MQTT 5.0 para iOS y macOS escrita en Swift. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 2.2.2, existe una vulnerabilidad en la l\u00f3gica de an\u00e1lisis de paquetes de CocoaMQTT que permite a un atacante (o un br\u00f3ker MQTT comprometido/malicioso) bloquear remotamente la aplicaci\u00f3n anfitriona de iOS/macOS/tvOS. Si un atacante publica la carga \u00fatil malformada de 4 bytes en un tema compartido con la bandera RETAIN establecida en verdadero, el br\u00f3ker MQTT persistir\u00e1 la carga \u00fatil. Cada vez que un cliente vulnerable se conecta y se suscribe a ese tema, el br\u00f3ker enviar\u00e1 autom\u00e1ticamente el paquete malformado. La aplicaci\u00f3n se bloquear\u00e1 instant\u00e1neamente en segundo plano antes de que el usuario pueda interactuar con ella. Esto efectivamente \u2019bloquea\u2019 la aplicaci\u00f3n m\u00f3vil (un DoS persistente) hasta que el mensaje retenido sea borrado manualmente de la base de datos del br\u00f3ker. Este problema ha sido parcheado en la versi\u00f3n 2.2.2."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-30867",
"lastModified": "2026-10-26T22:10:00.163",
"metrics": {
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"baseScore": 5.7,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
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"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-04-02T16:18:50.452760Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
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"published": "2026-04-02T14:16:28.407",
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.