FKIE_CVE-2026-2888
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-03-13 19:54 - Updated: 2026-06-17 10:31| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Formidable Forms \u2013 Contact Form Plugin, Survey, Quiz, Payment, Calculator Form \u0026 Custom Form Builder",
"vendor": "strategy11team",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.28",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security@wordfence.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The Formidable Forms plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to an authorization bypass through user-controlled key in all versions up to, and including, 6.28. This is due to the `frm_strp_amount` AJAX handler (`update_intent_ajax`) overwriting the global `$_POST` data with attacker-controlled JSON input and then using those values to recalculate payment amounts via field shortcode resolution in `generate_false_entry()`. The handler relies on a nonce that is publicly exposed in the page\u0027s JavaScript (`frm_stripe_vars.nonce`), which provides CSRF protection but not authorization. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to manipulate PaymentIntent amounts before payment completion on forms using dynamic pricing with field shortcodes, effectively paying a reduced amount for goods or services."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "El plugin Formidable Forms para WordPress es vulnerable a un bypass de autorizaci\u00f3n a trav\u00e9s de una clave controlada por el usuario en todas las versiones hasta la 6.28, inclusive. Esto se debe a que el gestor AJAX `frm_strp_amount` (`update_intent_ajax`) sobrescribe los datos globales `$_POST` con entrada JSON controlada por el atacante y luego utiliza esos valores para recalcular los importes de pago a trav\u00e9s de la resoluci\u00f3n de shortcode de campo en `generate_false_entry()`. El gestor se basa en un nonce que est\u00e1 expuesto p\u00fablicamente en el JavaScript de la p\u00e1gina (`frm_stripe_vars.nonce`), lo que proporciona protecci\u00f3n CSRF pero no autorizaci\u00f3n. Esto hace posible que atacantes no autenticados manipulen los importes de PaymentIntent antes de la finalizaci\u00f3n del pago en formularios que utilizan precios din\u00e1micos con shortcodes de campo, pagando efectivamente una cantidad reducida por bienes o servicios."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-2888",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:31:58.540",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-2888",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-03-13T16:04:01.348416Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-03-13T19:54:34.707",
"references": [
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/formidable/tags/6.28/stripe/controllers/FrmStrpLiteHooksController.php#L88"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/formidable/tags/6.28/stripe/models/FrmStrpLiteAuth.php#L322"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/formidable/tags/6.28/stripe/models/FrmStrpLiteAuth.php#L402"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026new=3480574%40formidable%2Ftrunk\u0026old=3460198%40formidable%2Ftrunk\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/b8be3b6e-a035-4e6f-ba2b-ce9e59ebf2e0?source=cve"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security@wordfence.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-639"
}
],
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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