FKIE_CVE-2026-28220
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-20 16:16 - Updated: 2026-07-29 15:37
Severity
8.4 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
9.1 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
9.1 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
Wazuh is a free and open source platform used for threat prevention, detection, and response. Prior to version 4.14.5, issues in the Cluster Distributed API (DAPI) handling allow a cluster peer, or any actor able to authenticate to the cluster channel using the shared cluster key, to make the master node deserialize an attacker-controlled callable and execute it under an attacker-controlled RBAC context. The cluster code in `framework/wazuh/core/cluster/common.py` deserializes JSON with `as_wazuh_object()`, which resolves any callable whose top-level package is wazuh or api (an overly broad allowlist controlled only by `ALLOWED_CALLABLES_PACKAGES`), and DAPI requests handled in framework/wazuh/core/cluster/dapi/dapi.py accept a client-supplied rbac_permissions value that `run_local()` applies as the global RBAC context, so supplying an rbac_mode of black causes authorization checks for expose_resources-protected functions to pass without any legitimate permission assignment. Combined, these allow privileged administrative actions on the master node such as arbitrary file writes under WAZUH_PATH, creation of new API users, and tampering with security.yaml, and can be chained into full manager compromise. This issue has been fixed in version 4.14.5.
References
| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| security-advisories@github.com | https://github.com/wazuh/wazuh/security/advisories/GHSA-w2jj-pfq9-mh9p | Exploit, Vendor Advisory | |
| 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 | https://github.com/wazuh/wazuh/security/advisories/GHSA-w2jj-pfq9-mh9p | Exploit, Vendor Advisory |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "wazuh",
"vendor": "wazuh",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 4.0.0, \u003c 4.14.5"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:wazuh:wazuh:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "5B2C5619-1B9D-4E29-808D-01D0EF4D9371",
"versionEndExcluding": "4.14.5",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.0.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Wazuh is a free and open source platform used for threat prevention, detection, and response. Prior to version 4.14.5, issues in the Cluster Distributed API (DAPI) handling allow a cluster peer, or any actor able to authenticate to the cluster channel using the shared cluster key, to make the master node deserialize an attacker-controlled callable and execute it under an attacker-controlled RBAC context. The cluster code in `framework/wazuh/core/cluster/common.py` deserializes JSON with `as_wazuh_object()`, which resolves any callable whose top-level package is wazuh or api (an overly broad allowlist controlled only by `ALLOWED_CALLABLES_PACKAGES`), and DAPI requests handled in framework/wazuh/core/cluster/dapi/dapi.py accept a client-supplied rbac_permissions value that `run_local()` applies as the global RBAC context, so supplying an rbac_mode of black causes authorization checks for expose_resources-protected functions to pass without any legitimate permission assignment. Combined, these allow privileged administrative actions on the master node such as arbitrary file writes under WAZUH_PATH, creation of new API users, and tampering with security.yaml, and can be chained into full manager compromise. This issue has been fixed in version 4.14.5."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-28220",
"lastModified": "2026-07-29T15:37:36.440",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.4,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.7,
"impactScore": 6.0,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.1,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.3,
"impactScore": 6.0,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-28220",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-07-20T17:30:32.187176Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-07-20T16:16:57.820",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/wazuh/wazuh/security/advisories/GHSA-w2jj-pfq9-mh9p"
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/wazuh/wazuh/security/advisories/GHSA-w2jj-pfq9-mh9p"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-502"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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