FKIE_CVE-2026-23901
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-02-10 10:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 10:22| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| security@apache.org | https://lists.apache.org/thread/mm1jct9b86jvnh3y44tj22xvjtx3xhhh | Issue Tracking, Mailing List, Third Party Advisory | |
| af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108 | http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/02/08/2 | Mailing List, Third Party Advisory |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "org.apache.shiro:shiro-core",
"product": "Apache Shiro",
"vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "2.0.7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security@apache.org"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:shiro:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "9E1B2B45-F100-4693-9F70-FE8D342853A3",
"versionEndExcluding": "2.0.7",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Observable Timing Discrepancy vulnerability in Apache Shiro.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Shiro: from 1.*, 2.* before 2.0.7.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 2.0.7 or later, which fixes the issue.\n\nPrior to Shiro 2.0.7, code paths for non-existent vs. existing users are different enough,\nthat a brute-force attack may be able to tell, by timing the requests only, determine if\nthe request failed because of a non-existent user vs. wrong password.\n\nThe most likely attack vector is a local attack only.\nShiro security model\u00a0 https://shiro.apache.org/security-model.html#username_enumeration \u00a0discusses this as well.\n\nTypically, brute force attack can be mitigated at the infrastructure level."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Vulnerabilidad de discrepancia de tiempo observable en Apache Shiro.\n\nEste problema afecta a Apache Shiro: desde 1.*, 2.* antes de 2.0.7.\n\nSe recomienda a los usuarios actualizar a la versi\u00f3n 2.0.7 o posterior, que soluciona el problema.\n\nAntes de Shiro 2.0.7, las rutas de c\u00f3digo para usuarios inexistentes frente a usuarios existentes son lo suficientemente diferentes como para que un ataque de fuerza bruta pueda discernir, solo cronometrando las solicitudes, si la solicitud fall\u00f3 debido a un usuario inexistente frente a una contrase\u00f1a incorrecta.\n\nEl vector de ataque m\u00e1s probable es solo un ataque local.\nEl modelo de seguridad de Shiro https://shiro.apache.org/security-model.html#username_enumeration tambi\u00e9n aborda esto.\n\nT\u00edpicamente, el ataque de fuerza bruta puede mitigarse a nivel de infraestructura."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-23901",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:22:16.960",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 2.5,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.0,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "YES",
"Recovery": "AUTOMATIC",
"Safety": "NEGLIGIBLE",
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 1.0,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "GREEN",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "ACTIVE",
"valueDensity": "CONCENTRATED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:N/AU:Y/R:A/V:C/RE:L/U:Green",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "LOW"
},
"source": "security@apache.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-23901",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-02-10T15:31:09.515973Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-02-10T10:15:59.240",
"references": [
{
"source": "security@apache.org",
"tags": [
"Issue Tracking",
"Mailing List",
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/mm1jct9b86jvnh3y44tj22xvjtx3xhhh"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Mailing List",
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/02/08/2"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-208"
}
],
"source": "security@apache.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.