FKIE_CVE-2026-23694
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-02-23 21:19 - Updated: 2026-06-17 10:21| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Aruba HiSpeed Cache",
"vendor": "Aruba.it",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "3.0.5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Aruba HiSpeed Cache (aruba-hispeed-cache) WordPress plugin versions prior to 3.0.5 contain a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability affecting multiple administrative AJAX actions. The handlers for ahsc_reset_options, ahsc_debug_status, and ahsc_enable_purge perform authentication and capability checks but do not verify a WordPress nonce for state-changing requests. An attacker can induce a logged-in administrator to visit a malicious webpage that submits forged requests to admin-ajax.php, resulting in unauthorized resetting of plugin settings, toggling of the WordPress WP_DEBUG configuration, or modification of cache purging behavior without the administrator\u2019s intent."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Las versiones del plugin de WordPress Aruba HiSpeed Cache (aruba-hispeed-cache) anteriores a la 3.0.5 contienen una vulnerabilidad de falsificaci\u00f3n de petici\u00f3n en sitios cruzados (CSRF) que afecta a m\u00faltiples acciones administrativas AJAX. Los manejadores para ahsc_reset_options, ahsc_debug_status y ahsc_enable_purge realizan comprobaciones de autenticaci\u00f3n y capacidad, pero no verifican un nonce de WordPress para las peticiones que cambian de estado. Un atacante puede inducir a un administrador con sesi\u00f3n iniciada a visitar una p\u00e1gina web maliciosa que env\u00eda peticiones falsificadas a admin-ajax.php, lo que resulta en el restablecimiento no autorizado de la configuraci\u00f3n del plugin, la activaci\u00f3n/desactivaci\u00f3n de la configuraci\u00f3n WP_DEBUG de WordPress, o la modificaci\u00f3n del comportamiento de purga de la cach\u00e9 sin la intenci\u00f3n del administrador."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-23694",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:21:57.890",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 5.1,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"subIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"userInteraction": "ACTIVE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-23694",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-02-25T15:06:57.627628Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-02-23T21:19:10.377",
"references": [
{
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"url": "https://hosting.aruba.it/en/wordpress.aspx"
},
{
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/aruba-hispeed-cache/"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-352"
}
],
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.