FKIE_CVE-2026-23125
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-02-14 15:16 - Updated: 2026-03-18 14:50
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: move SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY right after SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT
A null-ptr-deref was reported in the SCTP transmit path when SCTP-AUTH key
initialization fails:
==================================================================
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f]
CPU: 0 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Tainted: G W 6.6.0 #2
RIP: 0010:sctp_packet_bundle_auth net/sctp/output.c:264 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sctp_packet_append_chunk+0xb36/0x1260 net/sctp/output.c:401
Call Trace:
sctp_packet_transmit_chunk+0x31/0x250 net/sctp/output.c:189
sctp_outq_flush_data+0xa29/0x26d0 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1111
sctp_outq_flush+0xc80/0x1240 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1217
sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.0+0x19a5/0x62c0 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1787
sctp_side_effects net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1198 [inline]
sctp_do_sm+0x1a3/0x670 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1169
sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x33e/0x640 net/sctp/associola.c:1052
sctp_inq_push+0x1dd/0x280 net/sctp/inqueue.c:88
sctp_rcv+0x11ae/0x3100 net/sctp/input.c:243
sctp6_rcv+0x3d/0x60 net/sctp/ipv6.c:1127
The issue is triggered when sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() fails in
sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack() while processing an INIT_ACK. In this case, the
command sequence is currently:
- SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT
- SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP (T1_INIT)
- SCTP_CMD_TIMER_START (T1_COOKIE)
- SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE (COOKIE_ECHOED)
- SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY
- SCTP_CMD_GEN_COOKIE_ECHO
If SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY fails, asoc->shkey remains NULL, while
asoc->peer.auth_capable and asoc->peer.peer_chunks have already been set by
SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT. This allows a DATA chunk with auth = 1 and shkey = NULL
to be queued by sctp_datamsg_from_user().
Since command interpretation stops on failure, no COOKIE_ECHO should been
sent via SCTP_CMD_GEN_COOKIE_ECHO. However, the T1_COOKIE timer has already
been started, and it may enqueue a COOKIE_ECHO into the outqueue later. As
a result, the DATA chunk can be transmitted together with the COOKIE_ECHO
in sctp_outq_flush_data(), leading to the observed issue.
Similar to the other places where it calls sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()
right after sctp_process_init(), this patch moves the SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY
immediately after SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT, before stopping T1_INIT and starting
T1_COOKIE. This ensures that if shared key generation fails, authenticated
DATA cannot be sent. It also allows the T1_INIT timer to retransmit INIT,
giving the client another chance to process INIT_ACK and retry key setup.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.19 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.19 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.19 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.19 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.19 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.19 |
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"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: move SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY right after SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT\n\nA null-ptr-deref was reported in the SCTP transmit path when SCTP-AUTH key\ninitialization fails:\n\n ==================================================================\n KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f]\n CPU: 0 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Tainted: G W 6.6.0 #2\n RIP: 0010:sctp_packet_bundle_auth net/sctp/output.c:264 [inline]\n RIP: 0010:sctp_packet_append_chunk+0xb36/0x1260 net/sctp/output.c:401\n Call Trace:\n\n sctp_packet_transmit_chunk+0x31/0x250 net/sctp/output.c:189\n sctp_outq_flush_data+0xa29/0x26d0 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1111\n sctp_outq_flush+0xc80/0x1240 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1217\n sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.0+0x19a5/0x62c0 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1787\n sctp_side_effects net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1198 [inline]\n sctp_do_sm+0x1a3/0x670 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1169\n sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x33e/0x640 net/sctp/associola.c:1052\n sctp_inq_push+0x1dd/0x280 net/sctp/inqueue.c:88\n sctp_rcv+0x11ae/0x3100 net/sctp/input.c:243\n sctp6_rcv+0x3d/0x60 net/sctp/ipv6.c:1127\n\nThe issue is triggered when sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() fails in\nsctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack() while processing an INIT_ACK. In this case, the\ncommand sequence is currently:\n\n- SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT\n- SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP (T1_INIT)\n- SCTP_CMD_TIMER_START (T1_COOKIE)\n- SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE (COOKIE_ECHOED)\n- SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY\n- SCTP_CMD_GEN_COOKIE_ECHO\n\nIf SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY fails, asoc-\u003eshkey remains NULL, while\nasoc-\u003epeer.auth_capable and asoc-\u003epeer.peer_chunks have already been set by\nSCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT. This allows a DATA chunk with auth = 1 and shkey = NULL\nto be queued by sctp_datamsg_from_user().\n\nSince command interpretation stops on failure, no COOKIE_ECHO should been\nsent via SCTP_CMD_GEN_COOKIE_ECHO. However, the T1_COOKIE timer has already\nbeen started, and it may enqueue a COOKIE_ECHO into the outqueue later. As\na result, the DATA chunk can be transmitted together with the COOKIE_ECHO\nin sctp_outq_flush_data(), leading to the observed issue.\n\nSimilar to the other places where it calls sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()\nright after sctp_process_init(), this patch moves the SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY\nimmediately after SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT, before stopping T1_INIT and starting\nT1_COOKIE. This ensures that if shared key generation fails, authenticated\nDATA cannot be sent. It also allows the T1_INIT timer to retransmit INIT,\ngiving the client another chance to process INIT_ACK and retry key setup."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\nsctp: mover SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY justo despu\u00e9s de SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT\n\nSe inform\u00f3 de una desreferencia de puntero nulo (null-ptr-deref) en la ruta de transmisi\u00f3n SCTP cuando falla la inicializaci\u00f3n de la clave SCTP-AUTH:\n\n ==================================================================\n KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f]\n CPU: 0 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Tainted: G W 6.6.0 #2\n RIP: 0010:sctp_packet_bundle_auth net/sctp/output.c:264 [inline]\n RIP: 0010:sctp_packet_append_chunk+0xb36/0x1260 net/sctp/output.c:401\n Call Trace:\n\n sctp_packet_transmit_chunk+0x31/0x250 net/sctp/output.c:189\n sctp_outq_flush_data+0xa29/0x26d0 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1111\n sctp_outq_flush+0xc80/0x1240 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1217\n sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.0+0x19a5/0x62c0 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1787\n sctp_side_effects net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1198 [inline]\n sctp_do_sm+0x1a3/0x670 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1169\n sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x33e/0x640 net/sctp/associola.c:1052\n sctp_inq_push+0x1dd/0x280 net/sctp/inqueue.c:88\n sctp_rcv+0x11ae/0x3100 net/sctp/input.c:243\n sctp6_rcv+0x3d/0x60 net/sctp/ipv6.c:1127\n\nEl problema se activa cuando sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() falla en sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack() mientras se procesa un INIT_ACK. En este caso, la secuencia de comandos es actualmente:\n\n- SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT\n- SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP (T1_INIT)\n- SCTP_CMD_TIMER_START (T1_COOKIE)\n- SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE (COOKIE_ECHOED)\n- SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY\n- SCTP_CMD_GEN_COOKIE_ECHO\n\nSi SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY falla, asoc-\u0026gt;shkey permanece NULL, mientras que asoc-\u0026gt;peer.auth_capable y asoc-\u0026gt;peer.peer_chunks ya han sido establecidos por SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT. Esto permite que un fragmento DATA con auth = 1 y shkey = NULL sea encolado por sctp_datamsg_from_user().\n\nDado que la interpretaci\u00f3n de comandos se detiene en caso de fallo, no deber\u00eda haberse enviado ning\u00fan COOKIE_ECHO a trav\u00e9s de SCTP_CMD_GEN_COOKIE_ECHO. Sin embargo, el temporizador T1_COOKIE ya se ha iniciado, y puede encolar un COOKIE_ECHO en la cola de salida (outqueue) m\u00e1s tarde. Como resultado, el fragmento DATA puede transmitirse junto con el COOKIE_ECHO en sctp_outq_flush_data(), lo que lleva al problema observado.\n\nDe forma similar a otros lugares donde llama a sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() justo despu\u00e9s de sctp_process_init(), este parche mueve el SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY inmediatamente despu\u00e9s de SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT, antes de detener T1_INIT e iniciar T1_COOKIE. Esto asegura que si la generaci\u00f3n de clave compartida falla, los datos autenticados (authenticated DATA) no puedan ser enviados. Tambi\u00e9n permite que el temporizador T1_INIT retransmita INIT, dando al cliente otra oportunidad de procesar INIT_ACK y reintentar la configuraci\u00f3n de la clave."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-23125",
"lastModified": "2026-03-18T14:50:20.100",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 5.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-02-14T15:16:07.740",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
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"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c4adb1f391a7b92a0405e9d7c05624c0d9f8a65"
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"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-476"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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