FKIE_CVE-2026-19565
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-23 20:16 - Updated: 2026-10-14 13:10
Severity
Summary
Apache::AppSamurai::Util versions through 1.01 for Perl generate predictable session authentication keys from the clock and process id in CreateSessionAuthKey.
CreateSessionAuthKey runs five rounds of SHA-256, each over a fresh Time::HiRes reading formatted to six decimal places, the running digest, and the process id. CreateSession calls it with an empty key source on every login, and the optional Keysource directive is the only route to the other branch. The result is 64 hex characters. The microsecond field of the first reading takes one of a million values, the later readings follow it within microseconds, and the process id is drawn from a small range.
The key is returned to the browser as the session cookie, and is combined with the configured server key to compute the session id and to encrypt the stored session data. An attacker who knows the second in which a session was created and the process id of the worker that created it can enumerate candidate keys and recover the victim's cookie, bypassing authentication for the protected resources. Each candidate has to be tried against the server, which validates the cookie with a key the attacker does not hold.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://cpan.org/modules",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"Apache::AppSamurai::Util"
],
"packageName": "Apache-AppSamurai",
"packageURL": "pkg:cpan/Apache-AppSamurai",
"programFiles": [
"lib/Apache/AppSamurai/Util.pm",
"lib/Apache/AppSamurai.pm"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "Apache::AppSamurai::Util::CreateSessionAuthKey"
},
{
"name": "Apache::AppSamurai::CreateSession"
}
],
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "1.01",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Apache::AppSamurai::Util versions through 1.01 for Perl generate predictable session authentication keys from the clock and process id in CreateSessionAuthKey.\n\nCreateSessionAuthKey runs five rounds of SHA-256, each over a fresh Time::HiRes reading formatted to six decimal places, the running digest, and the process id. CreateSession calls it with an empty key source on every login, and the optional Keysource directive is the only route to the other branch. The result is 64 hex characters. The microsecond field of the first reading takes one of a million values, the later readings follow it within microseconds, and the process id is drawn from a small range.\n\nThe key is returned to the browser as the session cookie, and is combined with the configured server key to compute the session id and to encrypt the stored session data. An attacker who knows the second in which a session was created and the process id of the worker that created it can enumerate candidate keys and recover the victim\u0027s cookie, bypassing authentication for the protected resources. Each candidate has to be tried against the server, which validates the cookie with a key the attacker does not hold."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Las versiones de Apache::AppSamurai::Util hasta la 1.01 para Perl generan claves de autenticaci\u00f3n de sesi\u00f3n predecibles a partir del reloj y el ID de proceso en CreateSessionAuthKey.\n\nCreateSessionAuthKey ejecuta cinco rondas de SHA-256, cada una sobre una lectura nueva de Time::HiRes formateada a seis decimales, el resumen en ejecuci\u00f3n y el ID de proceso. CreateSession lo llama con una fuente de clave vac\u00eda en cada inicio de sesi\u00f3n, y la directiva opcional Keysource es la \u00fanica ruta a la otra rama. El resultado son 64 caracteres hexadecimales. El campo de microsegundos de la primera lectura toma uno de un mill\u00f3n de valores, las lecturas posteriores lo siguen en microsegundos, y el ID de proceso se extrae de un rango peque\u00f1o.\n\nLa clave se devuelve al navegador como la cookie de sesi\u00f3n, y se combina con la clave de servidor configurada para calcular el ID de sesi\u00f3n y para cifrar los datos de sesi\u00f3n almacenados. Un atacante que conoce el segundo en que se cre\u00f3 una sesi\u00f3n y el ID de proceso del trabajador que la cre\u00f3 puede enumerar claves candidatas y recuperar la cookie de la v\u00edctima, eludiendo la autenticaci\u00f3n para los recursos protegidos. Cada candidato debe ser probado contra el servidor, que valida la cookie con una clave que el atacante no posee."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-19565",
"lastModified": "2026-10-14T13:10:00.187",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 3.7,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-19565",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-25T19:31:22.304070Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-23T20:16:50.053",
"references": [
{
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/PAULDOOM/Apache-AppSamurai-1.01/source/lib/Apache/AppSamurai.pm#L1446-1533"
},
{
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/PAULDOOM/Apache-AppSamurai-1.01/source/lib/Apache/AppSamurai/Util.pm#L106-135"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/23/4"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-341"
}
],
"source": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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