FKIE_CVE-2026-18860
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-11 15:17 - Updated: 2026-10-23 19:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com/Velocidex/velociraptor/releases",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "Velociraptor",
"platforms": [
"Linux"
],
"product": "Velociraptor",
"repo": "https://github.com/Velocidex/velociraptor/",
"vendor": "Rapid7",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0.77.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "cve@rapid7.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Velociraptor allows multi-tenant deployments named \"Orgs\".\n\nBy default Velociraptor, uses the ROOT org, but users can create child orgs for other tenants within the same deployment.\n\nUsers can have different permissions in each org. To manage Orgs, Velociraptor usually examines the ORG_ADMIN permission on the ROOT org.\n\nThis issue results from the Velociraptor server allowing for the deletion of Orgs by incorrectly checking the ORG_ADMIN permission of callers within the calling ORG instead of the ROOT org. However, Org admins of child orgs were able to add this permission to their ACL token within their own org.\u00a0This allows an administrator in a child org, which is not also an administrator in the ROOT org, to delete other orgs."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Velociraptor permite despliegues multi-inquilino denominados \u2019Orgs\u2019.\n\nPor defecto, Velociraptor utiliza la org ROOT, pero los usuarios pueden crear orgs secundarias para otros inquilinos dentro del mismo despliegue.\n\nLos usuarios pueden tener diferentes permisos en cada org. Para gestionar Orgs, Velociraptor normalmente examina el permiso ORG_ADMIN en la org ROOT.\n\nEste problema se debe a que el servidor de Velociraptor permite la eliminaci\u00f3n de Orgs al verificar incorrectamente el permiso ORG_ADMIN de los llamantes dentro de la ORG llamante en lugar de la org ROOT. Sin embargo, los administradores de Org de orgs secundarias pudieron a\u00f1adir este permiso a su token ACL dentro de su propia org. Esto permite a un administrador en una org secundaria, que no es tambi\u00e9n un administrador en la org ROOT, eliminar otras orgs."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-18860",
"lastModified": "2026-10-23T19:10:00.167",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.7,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.3,
"impactScore": 5.8,
"source": "cve@rapid7.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-18860",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-11T19:25:41.955281Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-11T15:17:28.887",
"references": [
{
"source": "cve@rapid7.com",
"url": "https://docs.velociraptor.app/announcements/advisories/cve-2026-18860/"
},
{
"source": "cve@rapid7.com",
"url": "https://github.com/Velocidex/velociraptor/commit/dc38bd6a7e12a678cd79e726bdd1ded4eed75967"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "cve@rapid7.com",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-280"
}
],
"source": "cve@rapid7.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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