FKIE_CVE-2026-1839
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-04-07 06:16 - Updated: 2026-10-26 22:10
Severity
Summary
A vulnerability in the HuggingFace Transformers library, specifically in the `Trainer` class, allows for arbitrary code execution. The `_load_rng_state()` method in `src/transformers/trainer.py` at line 3059 calls `torch.load()` without the `weights_only=True` parameter. This issue affects all versions of the library supporting `torch>=2.2` when used with PyTorch versions below 2.6, as the `safe_globals()` context manager provides no protection in these versions. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by supplying a malicious checkpoint file, such as `rng_state.pth`, which can execute arbitrary code when loaded. The issue is resolved in version v5.0.0rc3.
References
| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| security@huntr.dev | https://github.com/huggingface/transformers/commit/03c8082ba4594c9b8d6fe190ca9bed0e5f8ca396 | Patch | |
| security@huntr.dev | https://huntr.com/bounties/3c77bb97-e493-493d-9a88-c57f5c536485 | Exploit, Third Party Advisory | |
| 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 | https://huntr.com/bounties/3c77bb97-e493-493d-9a88-c57f5c536485 | Exploit, Third Party Advisory |
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| huggingface | transformers | * | |
| huggingface | transformers | 5.0.0 | |
| huggingface | transformers | 5.0.0 | |
| huggingface | transformers | 5.0.0 |
{
"affected": [
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"product": "huggingface/transformers",
"vendor": "huggingface",
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"status": "affected",
"version": "unspecified",
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}
],
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}
],
"configurations": [
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"value": "A vulnerability in the HuggingFace Transformers library, specifically in the `Trainer` class, allows for arbitrary code execution. The `_load_rng_state()` method in `src/transformers/trainer.py` at line 3059 calls `torch.load()` without the `weights_only=True` parameter. This issue affects all versions of the library supporting `torch\u003e=2.2` when used with PyTorch versions below 2.6, as the `safe_globals()` context manager provides no protection in these versions. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by supplying a malicious checkpoint file, such as `rng_state.pth`, which can execute arbitrary code when loaded. The issue is resolved in version v5.0.0rc3."
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"value": "Una vulnerabilidad en la biblioteca HuggingFace Transformers, espec\u00edficamente en la clase \u201cTrainer\u201d, permite la ejecuci\u00f3n de c\u00f3digo arbitrario. El m\u00e9todo \u201c_load_rng_state()\u201d en \u201csrc/transformers/trainer.py\u201d en la l\u00ednea 3059 llama a \u201ctorch.load()\u201d sin el par\u00e1metro \u201cweights_only=True\u201d. Este problema afecta a todas las versiones de la biblioteca que soportan \u201ctorchmayor o igual que 2.2\u201d cuando se usan con versiones de PyTorch inferiores a 2.6, ya que el gestor de contexto \u201csafe_globals()\u201d no proporciona protecci\u00f3n en estas versiones. Un atacante puede explotar esta vulnerabilidad suministrando un archivo de punto de control malicioso, como \u201crng_state.pth\u201d, que puede ejecutar c\u00f3digo arbitrario cuando se carga. El problema est\u00e1 resuelto en la versi\u00f3n v5.0.0rc3."
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"id": "CVE-2026-1839",
"lastModified": "2026-10-26T22:10:00.163",
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.