FKIE_CVE-2026-18322

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-05 06:16 - Updated: 2026-08-12 21:00
Severity
8.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
The Smart Popup by Supsystic plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.12.0. This is due to a permission map collision in the `havePermissions()` function in `classes/frame.php`, where `array_merge()` overwrites the popup module's administrator-restricted method list with the base controller's value, silently removing `save` from protected actions; this is compounded by the subscription confirmation email embedding the same generic `pps_nonce` that the unauthenticated `wp_ajax_nopriv_save` endpoint accepts, and by the complete absence of any server-side role allowlist in `createWpSubscriber()`. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to submit a crafted POST request to `admin-ajax.php` using a nonce obtained from a public subscription confirmation email, setting `params[tpl][sub_wp_create_user_role]` to `administrator` via the exposed `popupControllerPps::save()` action, and then triggering the stored confirmation flow to create a persistent WordPress Administrator account with attacker-chosen credentials.
References
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/popup-by-supsystic/tags/1.11.2/classes/frame.php#L180
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/popup-by-supsystic/tags/1.11.2/modules/popup/models/popup.php#L316
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/popup-by-supsystic/tags/1.11.2/modules/subscribe/models/subscribe.php#L292
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/popup-by-supsystic/tags/1.11.2/modules/subscribe/models/subscribe.php#L358
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/popup-by-supsystic/tags/1.11.2/modules/subscribe/models/subscribe.php#L440
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=&sfph_mail=&reponame=&new=3629986%40popup-by-supsystic%2Ftrunk%2Fmodules%2Fsubscribe%2Fmodels%2Fsubscribe.php&old=3628131%40popup-by-supsystic%2Ftrunk%2Fmodules%2Fsubscribe%2Fmodels%2Fsubscribe.php&sfp_email=&sfph_mail=
security@wordfence.comhttps://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/835579b0-8a96-40fa-a6a3-30571a0a1d0a?source=cve
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Smart Popup by Supsystic",
          "vendor": "supsysticcom",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "1.12.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@wordfence.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The Smart Popup by Supsystic plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.12.0. This is due to a permission map collision in the `havePermissions()` function in `classes/frame.php`, where `array_merge()` overwrites the popup module\u0027s administrator-restricted method list with the base controller\u0027s value, silently removing `save` from protected actions; this is compounded by the subscription confirmation email embedding the same generic `pps_nonce` that the unauthenticated `wp_ajax_nopriv_save` endpoint accepts, and by the complete absence of any server-side role allowlist in `createWpSubscriber()`. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to submit a crafted POST request to `admin-ajax.php` using a nonce obtained from a public subscription confirmation email, setting `params[tpl][sub_wp_create_user_role]` to `administrator` via the exposed `popupControllerPps::save()` action, and then triggering the stored confirmation flow to create a persistent WordPress Administrator account with attacker-chosen credentials."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-18322",
  "lastModified": "2026-08-12T21:00:37.147",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "security@wordfence.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-18322",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-08-05T14:12:18.732279Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-08-05T06:16:37.330",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/popup-by-supsystic/tags/1.11.2/classes/frame.php#L180"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/popup-by-supsystic/tags/1.11.2/modules/popup/models/popup.php#L316"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/popup-by-supsystic/tags/1.11.2/modules/subscribe/models/subscribe.php#L292"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/popup-by-supsystic/tags/1.11.2/modules/subscribe/models/subscribe.php#L358"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/popup-by-supsystic/tags/1.11.2/modules/subscribe/models/subscribe.php#L440"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026new=3629986%40popup-by-supsystic%2Ftrunk%2Fmodules%2Fsubscribe%2Fmodels%2Fsubscribe.php\u0026old=3628131%40popup-by-supsystic%2Ftrunk%2Fmodules%2Fsubscribe%2Fmodels%2Fsubscribe.php\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/835579b0-8a96-40fa-a6a3-30571a0a1d0a?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@wordfence.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-269"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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