FKIE_CVE-2026-13208

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-24 21:16 - Updated: 2026-10-25 22:10
Severity
6.5 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H
Summary
A flaw was found in KubeVirt's virt-handler domain notify server. The gRPC handlers for HandleDomainEvent and HandleK8SEvent derive the VMI identity (namespace/name) solely from the request body without validating it against the connection's origin. Each virt-launcher pod connects through a per-VMI pipe socket, but no identity tag is propagated from the pipe path to the server handlers. This allows a compromised virt-launcher process to send forged domain lifecycle events for any other VMI scheduled on the same node, causing virt-handler to erroneously update that VMI's state and disrupt its lifecycle management.
References
secalert@redhat.comhttps://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-13208Mitigation, Vendor Advisory
secalert@redhat.comhttps://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2492220Issue Tracking, Vendor Advisory
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
kubevirt kubevirt -
redhat openshift_virtualization *
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:/a:redhat:container_native_virtualization:4"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "packageName": "container-native-virtualization/virt-handler",
          "product": "Red Hat OpenShift Virtualization 4",
          "vendor": "Red Hat"
        },
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:/a:redhat:container_native_virtualization:4"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "packageName": "container-native-virtualization/virt-handler-rhel9",
          "product": "Red Hat OpenShift Virtualization 4",
          "vendor": "Red Hat"
        }
      ],
      "source": "secalert@redhat.com"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:kubevirt:kubevirt:-:*:*:*:*:kubernetes:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "06AF9668-6158-47F4-A755-0EE4D5F7F413",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:redhat:openshift_virtualization:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "5301905C-9B5C-479F-A69A-659C6CB3AA42",
              "versionEndIncluding": "4.22.0",
              "versionStartIncluding": "4",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "A flaw was found in KubeVirt\u0027s virt-handler domain notify server. The gRPC handlers for HandleDomainEvent and HandleK8SEvent derive the VMI identity (namespace/name) solely from the request body without validating it against the connection\u0027s origin. Each virt-launcher pod connects through a per-VMI pipe socket, but no identity tag is propagated from the pipe path to the server handlers. This allows a compromised virt-launcher process to send forged domain lifecycle events for any other VMI scheduled on the same node, causing virt-handler to erroneously update that VMI\u0027s state and disrupt its lifecycle management."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Se encontr\u00f3 una falla en el servidor de notificaci\u00f3n de dominio virt-handler de KubeVirt. Los gestores gRPC para HandleDomainEvent y HandleK8SEvent derivan la identidad de la VMI (namespace/name) \u00fanicamente del cuerpo de la solicitud sin validarla contra el origen de la conexi\u00f3n. Cada pod virt-launcher se conecta a trav\u00e9s de un socket de tuber\u00eda por VMI, pero no se propaga ninguna etiqueta de identidad desde la ruta de la tuber\u00eda a los gestores del servidor. Esto permite a un proceso virt-launcher comprometido enviar eventos falsificados del ciclo de vida del dominio para cualquier otra VMI programada en el mismo nodo, haciendo que virt-handler actualice err\u00f3neamente el estado de esa VMI y perturbe su gesti\u00f3n del ciclo de vida."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-13208",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-25T22:10:00.150",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 6.5,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.0,
        "impactScore": 4.0,
        "source": "secalert@redhat.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-13208",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-06-25T15:32:58.431125Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-06-24T21:16:52.547",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "secalert@redhat.com",
      "tags": [
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-13208"
    },
    {
      "source": "secalert@redhat.com",
      "tags": [
        "Issue Tracking",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2492220"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "secalert@redhat.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-287"
        }
      ],
      "source": "secalert@redhat.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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