FKIE_CVE-2026-121481
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-18 12:17 - Updated: 2026-11-20 20:17| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "OpenSSL",
"vendor": "OpenSSL",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.1.1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.1.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.0.4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.0.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Issue summary: Calling EVP_EncodeBlock() with an input length close to INT_MAX\nmay overflow the calculation of the encoded output size and write past the end\nof the caller-supplied output buffer.\n\nImpact summary: No path by which an attacker can trigger this has been\nidentified. An application that passes an input length near INT_MAX to\nEVP_EncodeBlock() could suffer a heap buffer overflow, crashing or corrupting\nits own memory, but it must itself supply such a length.\n\nCWE: CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound\n\nDescription: EVP_EncodeBlock() base64-encodes a buffer of a caller-supplied\nlength into an output buffer that the caller allocates. The caller is expected\nto reserve 4*((len+2)/3)+1 bytes. For input lengths close to INT_MAX, the\narithmetic that computes the encoded length overflows a signed integer, so the\nfunction writes more data than the documented output size. The result is a\nheap buffer overflow in the calling process.\n\nReaching this requires an application to pass an input length near INT_MAX to\nEVP_EncodeBlock(). OpenSSL\u0027s TLS, QUIC and CMS implementations never encode\nbuffers of that size, and the command line tools cannot practically be made to\ndo so: the limits on reading a proxy password from a file and on bignum sizes\nprevent it. An application that accepts an attacker-controlled length and\nforwards it to EVP_EncodeBlock() without its own bound check is exposed.\n\nThe severity is Low because no attacker-controlled path to the overflow is\nknown. The caller must already hold a buffer of about two gigabytes before the\ndefect can be reached.\n\nFIPS impact: no\nThe affected code is outside the FIPS module boundary."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-121481",
"lastModified": "2026-11-20T20:17:13.820",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 5.9,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-121481",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-20T19:45:06.462019Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-11-18T12:17:04.313",
"references": [
{
"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/33652"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"url": "https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50569226"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-190"
}
],
"source": "openssl-security@openssl.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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