FKIE_CVE-2026-119220

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-18 12:17 - Updated: 2026-11-18 16:18
Summary
The Dokan: AI Powered WooCommerce Multivendor Marketplace Solution – Build Your Own Amazon, eBay, Etsy plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass in all versions up to, and including, 5.3.3. The vulnerability exists because the `matches_mcp_endpoint()` function applies an unanchored regular expression (`#/(?:woocommerce|dokan)/mcp(?:/|$)#`) against the entire `REQUEST_URI` including the query string, meaning any request that contains the literal substring `/dokan/mcp/` or `/woocommerce/mcp/` anywhere in its URI — including inside a query parameter value — is incorrectly treated as a trusted internal MCP context, causing `scope_product_permissions()` to unconditionally return `true` on WooCommerce's `woocommerce_rest_check_permissions` filter regardless of whether the caller is authenticated. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read full authenticated WooCommerce REST product records for any published product — including private underscore-prefixed meta, purchase notes, downloadable file URLs for paid digital products, catalog-hidden products, and edit-context representations — across the `/wc/v1`, `/wc/v2`, `/wc/v3`, and `/wc-analytics` REST namespaces. The bypass is triggered by appending a query parameter whose value contains the literal string `/dokan/mcp/` to any WooCommerce REST product endpoint (e.g., `/wp-json/wc/v3/products/{id}?x=/dokan/mcp/`); note that percent-encoding the slashes prevents the bypass, as the unencoded literal slash characters are required for the regex to match.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Dokan: AI Powered WooCommerce Multivendor Marketplace Solution \u2013 Build Your Own Amazon, eBay, Etsy",
          "vendor": "dokaninc",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.3.3",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@wordfence.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The Dokan: AI Powered WooCommerce Multivendor Marketplace Solution \u2013 Build Your Own Amazon, eBay, Etsy plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass in all versions up to, and including, 5.3.3. The vulnerability exists because the `matches_mcp_endpoint()` function applies an unanchored regular expression (`#/(?:woocommerce|dokan)/mcp(?:/|$)#`) against the entire `REQUEST_URI` including the query string, meaning any request that contains the literal substring `/dokan/mcp/` or `/woocommerce/mcp/` anywhere in its URI \u2014 including inside a query parameter value \u2014 is incorrectly treated as a trusted internal MCP context, causing `scope_product_permissions()` to unconditionally return `true` on WooCommerce\u0027s `woocommerce_rest_check_permissions` filter regardless of whether the caller is authenticated. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read full authenticated WooCommerce REST product records for any published product \u2014 including private underscore-prefixed meta, purchase notes, downloadable file URLs for paid digital products, catalog-hidden products, and edit-context representations \u2014 across the `/wc/v1`, `/wc/v2`, `/wc/v3`, and `/wc-analytics` REST namespaces. The bypass is triggered by appending a query parameter whose value contains the literal string `/dokan/mcp/` to any WooCommerce REST product endpoint (e.g., `/wp-json/wc/v3/products/{id}?x=/dokan/mcp/`); note that percent-encoding the slashes prevents the bypass, as the unencoded literal slash characters are required for the regex to match."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-119220",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-18T16:18:00.527",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 7.5,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "security@wordfence.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-119220",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-11-18T15:24:57.438096Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-11-18T12:17:02.927",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/dokan-lite/tags/5.3.0/includes/Abilities/ProductAbilityScope.php#L150"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/dokan-lite/tags/5.3.0/includes/Abilities/ProductAbilityScope.php#L179"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/dokan-lite/tags/5.3.0/includes/Abilities/Support/RequestContext.php#L223"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/dokan-lite/tags/5.3.0/includes/Abilities/Support/RequestContext.php#L94"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3785932%40dokan-lite\u0026new=3785932%40dokan-lite"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/763f48c1-9686-4385-a78e-573d4bf2bae6?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@wordfence.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-285"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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