FKIE_CVE-2026-119215

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-03 16:17 - Updated: 2026-11-03 18:17
Severity
7.6 (High) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Summary
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows a user with an account to install a TOTP secret they control on another user's account, and then sign in as that user or hold their second factor. AshAuthentication.Strategy.Totp.ConfirmSetupChange verified a setup token but did not check that it was issued to the record being confirmed, so an attacker's own pending secret could be confirmed onto another user's record. The TOTP setup changes, ConfirmSetupChange, GeneratePendingSetupChange and GenerateSecretChange, also marked their changesets as AshAuthentication interactions, which the standard AshAuthenticationInteraction policy bypass lets through. A policy limiting setup and confirm_setup to the actor's own record therefore never ran when an application exposed those actions by record key, and a direct setup call on another user's record returned that user's pending secret and setup token. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.16.
References
6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49dbhttps://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-119215.html
6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49dbhttps://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/4058be0f519c2e9b0d2266e90f9c7d8547d54574
6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49dbhttps://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/6e7a880698614887527a87df206b4eb0c0fbd8c1
6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49dbhttps://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-gx67-694c-655c
6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49dbhttps://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-119215
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.Totp.ConfirmSetupChange\u0027",
            "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.Totp.GeneratePendingSetupChange\u0027",
            "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.Totp.GenerateSecretChange\u0027"
          ],
          "packageName": "ash_authentication",
          "packageURL": "pkg:hex/ash_authentication",
          "product": "ash_authentication",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/ash_authentication/strategies/totp/confirm_setup_change.ex",
            "lib/ash_authentication/strategies/totp/generate_pending_setup_change.ex",
            "lib/ash_authentication/strategies/totp/generate_secret_change.ex"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.Totp.ConfirmSetupChange\u0027:change/3"
            },
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.Totp.GeneratePendingSetupChange\u0027:change/3"
            },
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.Totp.GenerateSecretChange\u0027:change/3"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication",
          "vendor": "team-alembic",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "5.0.0-rc.16",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.0.0-rc.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.Totp.ConfirmSetupChange\u0027",
            "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.Totp.GeneratePendingSetupChange\u0027",
            "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.Totp.GenerateSecretChange\u0027"
          ],
          "packageName": "team-alembic/ash_authentication",
          "packageURL": "pkg:github/team-alembic/ash_authentication",
          "product": "ash_authentication",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/ash_authentication/strategies/totp/confirm_setup_change.ex",
            "lib/ash_authentication/strategies/totp/generate_pending_setup_change.ex",
            "lib/ash_authentication/strategies/totp/generate_secret_change.ex"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.Totp.ConfirmSetupChange\u0027:change/3"
            },
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.Totp.GeneratePendingSetupChange\u0027:change/3"
            },
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.Totp.GenerateSecretChange\u0027:change/3"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication",
          "vendor": "team-alembic",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4058be0f519c2e9b0d2266e90f9c7d8547d54574",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6e7a880698614887527a87df206b4eb0c0fbd8c1",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows a user with an account to install a TOTP secret they control on another user\u0027s account, and then sign in as that user or hold their second factor.\n\nAshAuthentication.Strategy.Totp.ConfirmSetupChange verified a setup token but did not check that it was issued to the record being confirmed, so an attacker\u0027s own pending secret could be confirmed onto another user\u0027s record. The TOTP setup changes, ConfirmSetupChange, GeneratePendingSetupChange and GenerateSecretChange, also marked their changesets as AshAuthentication interactions, which the standard AshAuthenticationInteraction policy bypass lets through. A policy limiting setup and confirm_setup to the actor\u0027s own record therefore never ran when an application exposed those actions by record key, and a direct setup call on another user\u0027s record returned that user\u0027s pending secret and setup token.\n\nThis issue affects ash_authentication: from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.16."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-119215",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-03T18:17:55.197",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 7.6,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-119215",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-11-03T17:49:11.213752Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-11-03T16:17:21.683",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-119215.html"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/4058be0f519c2e9b0d2266e90f9c7d8547d54574"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/6e7a880698614887527a87df206b4eb0c0fbd8c1"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-gx67-694c-655c"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-119215"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-639"
        }
      ],
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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