FKIE_CVE-2026-116676

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-27 18:17 - Updated: 2026-10-27 18:17
Severity
8.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
Atlantis is a self-hosted golang application that listens for Terraform pull request events via webhooks. From version 0.4.0 until 0.47.1, Atlantis passes the pull-request-controlled workspace value from atlantis.yaml into Terraform command arguments that are joined with strings.Join(args, " ") and executed through sh -c. An authenticated contributor whose pull request is eligible for an Atlantis plan can include shell metacharacters in the workspace name, causing arbitrary commands to execute as the Atlantis service account without custom workflows, apply permission, or a malicious Terraform provider. External contributors can reach the flaw through fork pull requests only when --allow-fork-prs is enabled, while eligible same-repository branches do not require that option. The commands inherit the Atlantis process environment and can access cloud-provider, Terraform, and version-control credentials as well as files, state, and network resources available to the service. This issue is fixed in version 0.47.1.
References
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/commit/8dd22b4d0a9d7c129fdbf6a3398dd1c4cf8c3a59
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/commit/f04df0d53f0544d9eb6f5026dd8b74fbefd82ac8
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/pull/6792
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/releases/tag/v0.47.1
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/security/advisories/GHSA-rjh2-4xgw-p2hj
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "atlantis",
          "vendor": "runatlantis",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 0.4.0, \u003c 0.47.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Atlantis is a self-hosted golang application that listens for Terraform pull request events via webhooks. From version 0.4.0 until 0.47.1, Atlantis passes the pull-request-controlled workspace value from atlantis.yaml into Terraform command arguments that are joined with strings.Join(args, \" \") and executed through sh -c. An authenticated contributor whose pull request is eligible for an Atlantis plan can include shell metacharacters in the workspace name, causing arbitrary commands to execute as the Atlantis service account without custom workflows, apply permission, or a malicious Terraform provider. External contributors can reach the flaw through fork pull requests only when --allow-fork-prs is enabled, while eligible same-repository branches do not require that option. The commands inherit the Atlantis process environment and can access cloud-provider, Terraform, and version-control credentials as well as files, state, and network resources available to the service. This issue is fixed in version 0.47.1."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-116676",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-27T18:17:35.220",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-10-27T18:17:35.220",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/commit/8dd22b4d0a9d7c129fdbf6a3398dd1c4cf8c3a59"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/commit/f04df0d53f0544d9eb6f5026dd8b74fbefd82ac8"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/pull/6792"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/releases/tag/v0.47.1"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/security/advisories/GHSA-rjh2-4xgw-p2hj"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-78"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}



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