FKIE_CVE-2026-116615
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-13 10:17 - Updated: 2026-11-13 20:17| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Widget Options \u2013 Advanced Conditional Visibility for Gutenberg Blocks \u0026 Classic Widgets",
"vendor": "marketingfire",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "4.2.6.1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security@wordfence.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The Widget Options \u2013 Advanced Conditional Visibility for Gutenberg Blocks \u0026 Classic Widgets plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Code Injection in all versions up to, and including, 4.2.6.1 via the `post_content` parameter. This is due to asymmetric parsing between the save-time strip filter (`widgetopts_strip_logic_from_blocks()`) and the render-time parser (`blockopts_filter_before_display()`): embedding an inner `\u003c!--start_widgetopts` literal inside a JSON key causes the write-side `json_decode` to see a non-`class` key and skip stripping \u2014 persisting the payload verbatim to the database \u2014 while the render-side `str_replace` reconstitutes the key to `class`, feeding the attacker-controlled `logic` value directly into `@eval`. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Author-level access and above, to inject PHP expressions that execute on every front-end page view, enabling boolean-oracle exfiltration of WordPress site configuration data \u2014 including admin email address, default role, and arbitrary `get_option`, `get_user_meta`, and `get_post_meta` values \u2014 via the plugin\u0027s allowlisted-function sandbox, which escalates to unrestricted code execution if any installed plugin extends the `widgetopts_allowed_php_functions` filter. Contributors can also exploit this vulnerability when their submitted post is later published by an administrator; notably, the injected payload executes for all site visitors, including unauthenticated users, because a trust-flag mechanism introduced in version 4.2.6 causes `widgetopts_safe_eval_trusted()` to bypass its non-admin short-circuit at every legacy render callsite. Exploitation by attackers with contributor-level access and above requires that an administrator (or editor) later publishes the contributor\u0027s submission. On a default installation, where that is not configured, the vulnerability requires attackers with author-level access and above."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-116615",
"lastModified": "2026-11-13T20:17:51.890",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-116615",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-13T19:28:28.486973Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-11-13T10:17:25.983",
"references": [
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/widget-options/tags/4.2.6.1/includes/extras.php#L792"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/widget-options/tags/4.2.6.1/includes/widgets/gutenberg/gutenberg-toolbar.php#L331"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/widget-options/tags/4.2.6.1/includes/widgets/gutenberg/gutenberg-toolbar.php#L377"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/widget-options/tags/4.2.6.1/includes/widgets/gutenberg/gutenberg-toolbar.php#L496"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/widget-options/tags/4.2.7/includes/widgets/gutenberg/gutenberg-toolbar.php"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/3f5e4431-2789-47c8-81ce-e9f67454accc?source=cve"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security@wordfence.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-94"
}
],
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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