FKIE_CVE-2026-115478

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-23 15:17 - Updated: 2026-10-23 15:17
Summary
obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.0.1 until 1.31.4, `create_entity`, `link_entities`, `rename_entity`, `unlink_entities` and `delete_entity` regenerate memory notes from SQLite at the computed `memory/<type>/<name>.md` path without reliably preserving note ownership or the consistency of a failed lifecycle operation. During shared materialization, a hand-authored note or an orphan left by a different entity whose name sanitized to the same path could have its entire body overwritten on the next write naming that type and name, with non-owned frontmatter preserved. `rename_entity` also seeded the destination path with a direct atomic write without validating ownership and could overwrite a foreign note there. Separately, several tools mutated SQLite before fallible filesystem work: `create_entity` and `link_entities` inserted the row or relation before materialization; `rename_entity` updated the entity, including a retired status, before updating its note; `unlink_entities` removed a relation before rematerializing the source note; and `delete_entity`'s cascade removed the target and its relations before rematerializing neighbouring notes. A later filesystem failure could therefore leave a row or relation changed and the memory graph inconsistent with the notes on disk even when the operation failed. An authorized caller with the required memory-tool permissions could, without intending to, destroy the body of a vault note outside the entity being written; `delete_entity` additionally requires its deletion permission and destructive confirmation, which this memory flaw does not bypass. Snapshots-before-write through `restore_note` mitigate the overwrite only where snapshots are enabled and the note had previously been written through obsidian-tc. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "obsidian-tc",
          "vendor": "The-40-Thieves",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 1.0.1, \u003c 1.31.4"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.0.1 until 1.31.4, `create_entity`, `link_entities`, `rename_entity`, `unlink_entities` and `delete_entity` regenerate memory notes from SQLite at the computed `memory/\u003ctype\u003e/\u003cname\u003e.md` path without reliably preserving note ownership or the consistency of a failed lifecycle operation. During shared materialization, a hand-authored note or an orphan left by a different entity whose name sanitized to the same path could have its entire body overwritten on the next write naming that type and name, with non-owned frontmatter preserved. `rename_entity` also seeded the destination path with a direct atomic write without validating ownership and could overwrite a foreign note there. Separately, several tools mutated SQLite before fallible filesystem work: `create_entity` and `link_entities` inserted the row or relation before materialization; `rename_entity` updated the entity, including a retired status, before updating its note; `unlink_entities` removed a relation before rematerializing the source note; and `delete_entity`\u0027s cascade removed the target and its relations before rematerializing neighbouring notes. A later filesystem failure could therefore leave a row or relation changed and the memory graph inconsistent with the notes on disk even when the operation failed. An authorized caller with the required memory-tool permissions could, without intending to, destroy the body of a vault note outside the entity being written; `delete_entity` additionally requires its deletion permission and destructive confirmation, which this memory flaw does not bypass. Snapshots-before-write through `restore_note` mitigate the overwrite only where snapshots are enabled and the note had previously been written through obsidian-tc. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-115478",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-23T15:17:30.147",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "NONE",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 7.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-10-23T15:17:30.023",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/99f7914ca0fbeed92e7c4d39cc8c3e5830dab133"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/978"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-r3g7-r4hr-m258"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-459"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-863"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}



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