FKIE_CVE-2026-104755

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-16 07:17 - Updated: 2026-10-16 15:17
Severity
4.8 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Summary
The WP Compress – Instant Performance & Speed Optimization plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 7.25.00 The vulnerability exists because the `start_comms` dispatcher (`wps_ic_comms::start_comms`), hooked on every front-end request, gates access only by comparing the caller-supplied `apikey` parameter against the stored plugin API key with no WordPress capability check and no nonce verification, then passes the unvalidated `group`, `setting`, and `value` parameters directly to `change_setting()`, which writes them into the `WPS_IC_SETTINGS` option without an allow-list. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to write arbitrary permission keys into the plugin's settings, causing `wps_ic_users::checkAndAddCaps()` to grant any WordPress role — including Subscriber — the `manage_wpc_settings` capability and thereby achieve plugin-administrator-equivalent control over the plugin's optimization, CDN, and critical-CSS surfaces. The API key required to pass the authorization check can itself be obtained without authentication via the `wpc_send_critical_remote` nopriv AJAX action: when the external critical-CSS service returns an `apiResults` field, `initCritical()` echoes the stored plugin API key back to the caller in a `wp_send_json_success` response, completing the exploit chain entirely without a WordPress login.
References
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-compress-image-optimizer/tags/7.10.03/addons/criticalCss/criticalCss.php#L409
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-compress-image-optimizer/tags/7.10.03/classes/ajax.class.php#L816
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-compress-image-optimizer/tags/7.10.03/classes/comms.class.php#L1042
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-compress-image-optimizer/tags/7.10.03/classes/comms.class.php#L49
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-compress-image-optimizer/tags/7.10.03/classes/users.class.php#L30
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=&new=3734610%40wp-compress-image-optimizer%2Ftags%2F7.26.00&old=3723132%40wp-compress-image-optimizer%2Ftags%2F7.25.00
security@wordfence.comhttps://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/67e9bfb8-b274-422a-a50d-a6b6b24bb193?source=cve
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "WP Compress \u2013 Instant Performance \u0026 Speed Optimization",
          "vendor": "aresit",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.25.00",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@wordfence.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The WP Compress \u2013 Instant Performance \u0026 Speed Optimization plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 7.25.00 The vulnerability exists because the `start_comms` dispatcher (`wps_ic_comms::start_comms`), hooked on every front-end request, gates access only by comparing the caller-supplied `apikey` parameter against the stored plugin API key with no WordPress capability check and no nonce verification, then passes the unvalidated `group`, `setting`, and `value` parameters directly to `change_setting()`, which writes them into the `WPS_IC_SETTINGS` option without an allow-list. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to write arbitrary permission keys into the plugin\u0027s settings, causing `wps_ic_users::checkAndAddCaps()` to grant any WordPress role \u2014 including Subscriber \u2014 the `manage_wpc_settings` capability and thereby achieve plugin-administrator-equivalent control over the plugin\u0027s optimization, CDN, and critical-CSS surfaces. The API key required to pass the authorization check can itself be obtained without authentication via the `wpc_send_critical_remote` nopriv AJAX action: when the external critical-CSS service returns an `apiResults` field, `initCritical()` echoes the stored plugin API key back to the caller in a `wp_send_json_success` response, completing the exploit chain entirely without a WordPress login."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-104755",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-16T15:17:03.683",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 4.8,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
        "impactScore": 2.5,
        "source": "security@wordfence.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-104755",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-10-16T14:55:02.789066Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-10-16T07:17:08.413",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-compress-image-optimizer/tags/7.10.03/addons/criticalCss/criticalCss.php#L409"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-compress-image-optimizer/tags/7.10.03/classes/ajax.class.php#L816"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-compress-image-optimizer/tags/7.10.03/classes/comms.class.php#L1042"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-compress-image-optimizer/tags/7.10.03/classes/comms.class.php#L49"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-compress-image-optimizer/tags/7.10.03/classes/users.class.php#L30"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026new=3734610%40wp-compress-image-optimizer%2Ftags%2F7.26.00\u0026old=3723132%40wp-compress-image-optimizer%2Ftags%2F7.25.00"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/67e9bfb8-b274-422a-a50d-a6b6b24bb193?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@wordfence.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-269"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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