FKIE_CVE-2026-10038

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-06 00:16 - Updated: 2026-06-06 00:16
Summary
The Charitable – Donation Plugin for WordPress – Fundraising with Recurring Donations & More plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference / Authorization Bypass leading to Arbitrary Attachment Deletion in versions up to, and including, 1.8.11.1 via the profile avatar update flow. This is due to the save_avatar() function in Charitable_Profile_Form calling wp_delete_attachment() on an attachment ID read from the user's 'avatar' meta without validating that the attachment is owned by the user, combined with Charitable_Data_Processor::process_picture() returning the raw posted value when no file is uploaded, allowing the 'avatar' user meta to be poisoned with any attacker-chosen attachment ID. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary attachments from the Media Library by performing a two-request chain (first poisoning the stored avatar meta value with a target attachment ID, then triggering deletion via a normal avatar upload).
References
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10.5/includes/abstracts/abstract-class-charitable-form.php#L429
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10.5/includes/forms/class-charitable-profile-form.php#L724
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10.5/includes/forms/class-charitable-profile-form.php#L728
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10.5/includes/users/class-charitable-user.php#L986
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10.5/includes/utilities/class-charitable-data-processor.php#L270
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10/includes/abstracts/abstract-class-charitable-form.php#L429
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10/includes/forms/class-charitable-profile-form.php#L724
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10/includes/forms/class-charitable-profile-form.php#L728
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10/includes/users/class-charitable-user.php#L986
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10/includes/utilities/class-charitable-data-processor.php#L270
security@wordfence.comhttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3557047/charitable/trunk/includes/forms/class-charitable-profile-form.php?old=3435951&old_path=charitable%2Ftrunk%2Fincludes%2Fforms%2Fclass-charitable-profile-form.php
security@wordfence.comhttps://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/657bea00-9709-48b8-807a-c9a18b0aee1d?source=cve
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The Charitable \u2013 Donation Plugin for WordPress \u2013 Fundraising with Recurring Donations \u0026 More plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference / Authorization Bypass leading to Arbitrary Attachment Deletion in versions up to, and including, 1.8.11.1 via the profile avatar update flow. This is due to the save_avatar() function in Charitable_Profile_Form calling wp_delete_attachment() on an attachment ID read from the user\u0027s \u0027avatar\u0027 meta without validating that the attachment is owned by the user, combined with Charitable_Data_Processor::process_picture() returning the raw posted value when no file is uploaded, allowing the \u0027avatar\u0027 user meta to be poisoned with any attacker-chosen attachment ID. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary attachments from the Media Library by performing a two-request chain (first poisoning the stored avatar meta value with a target attachment ID, then triggering deletion via a normal avatar upload)."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-10038",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-06T00:16:40.670",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 4.3,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 1.4,
        "source": "security@wordfence.com",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-06-06T00:16:40.670",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10.5/includes/abstracts/abstract-class-charitable-form.php#L429"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10.5/includes/forms/class-charitable-profile-form.php#L724"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10.5/includes/forms/class-charitable-profile-form.php#L728"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10.5/includes/users/class-charitable-user.php#L986"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10.5/includes/utilities/class-charitable-data-processor.php#L270"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10/includes/abstracts/abstract-class-charitable-form.php#L429"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10/includes/forms/class-charitable-profile-form.php#L724"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10/includes/forms/class-charitable-profile-form.php#L728"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10/includes/users/class-charitable-user.php#L986"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/charitable/tags/1.8.10/includes/utilities/class-charitable-data-processor.php#L270"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3557047/charitable/trunk/includes/forms/class-charitable-profile-form.php?old=3435951\u0026old_path=charitable%2Ftrunk%2Fincludes%2Fforms%2Fclass-charitable-profile-form.php"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/657bea00-9709-48b8-807a-c9a18b0aee1d?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@wordfence.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-639"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@wordfence.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…