FKIE_CVE-2025-68760
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-01-05 10:15 - Updated: 2026-10-14 19:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/iommu/amd/debugfs.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "b959df804c33913dbfdb90750f2d693502b3d126",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7a4ee419e8c144b747a8915856e91a034d7c8f34",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "0ec4aaf5f3f559716a6559f3d6d9616e9470bed6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7a4ee419e8c144b747a8915856e91a034d7c8f34",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "a0c7005333f9a968abb058b1d77bbcd7fb7fd1e7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7a4ee419e8c144b747a8915856e91a034d7c8f34",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/iommu/amd/debugfs.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.17"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.17",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.17.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.17.13",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.2",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.19",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu/amd: Fix potential out-of-bounds read in iommu_mmio_show\n\nIn iommu_mmio_write(), it validates the user-provided offset with the\ncheck: `iommu-\u003edbg_mmio_offset \u003e iommu-\u003emmio_phys_end - 4`.\nThis assumes a 4-byte access. However, the corresponding\nshow handler, iommu_mmio_show(), uses readq() to perform an 8-byte\n(64-bit) read.\n\nIf a user provides an offset equal to `mmio_phys_end - 4`, the check\npasses, and will lead to a 4-byte out-of-bounds read.\n\nFix this by adjusting the boundary check to use sizeof(u64), which\ncorresponds to the size of the readq() operation."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\niommu/amd: Corrige una posible lectura fuera de l\u00edmites en iommu_mmio_show\n\nEn iommu_mmio_write(), valida el desplazamiento proporcionado por el usuario con la comprobaci\u00f3n: \u0027iommu -\u003e dbg_mmio_offset \u003e iommu -\u003e mmio_phys_end - 4\u0027.\nEsto asume un acceso de 4 bytes. Sin embargo, el controlador de visualizaci\u00f3n correspondiente, iommu_mmio_show(), usa readq() para realizar una lectura de 8 bytes (64 bits).\n\nSi un usuario proporciona un desplazamiento igual a \u0027mmio_phys_end - 4\u0027, la comprobaci\u00f3n pasa y conducir\u00e1 a una lectura fuera de l\u00edmites de 4 bytes.\n\nSoluciona esto ajustando la comprobaci\u00f3n de l\u00edmites para usar sizeof(u64), lo que corresponde al tama\u00f1o de la operaci\u00f3n readq()."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-68760",
"lastModified": "2026-10-14T19:10:00.297",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-01-05T10:15:57.123",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ec4aaf5f3f559716a6559f3d6d9616e9470bed6"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a0c7005333f9a968abb058b1d77bbcd7fb7fd1e7"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b959df804c33913dbfdb90750f2d693502b3d126"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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