FKIE_CVE-2025-68624
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-14 01:16 - Updated: 2026-10-14 19:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unknown",
"product": "Mail Assure",
"vendor": "N-able",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "April 2026",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"source": "cve@mitre.org"
}
],
"cveTags": [
{
"sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
"tags": [
"disputed",
"exclusively-hosted-service"
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "N-able Mail Assure through April 2026 contains a design-level authorization flaw that allows an authenticated SMTP user to send outbound email using MAIL FROM addresses belonging to other tenants. When connecting to the SMTP TCP port and performing SMTP AUTH with valid credentials, the server accepts arbitrary sender domains without enforcing any domain-to-account binding. As a result, an attacker from any tenant can impersonate other tenant domains, producing messages that pass SPF and DMARC validation. NOTE: N-able\u0027s position is that the behavior is intended functionality of its shared SMTP relay architecture and that the service does not represent that it enforces per-tenant sender-domain binding."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "N-able Mail Assure hasta abril de 2026 contiene una falla de autorizaci\u00f3n a nivel de dise\u00f1o que permite a un usuario SMTP autenticado enviar correo electr\u00f3nico saliente utilizando direcciones MAIL FROM pertenecientes a otros inquilinos. Al conectarse al puerto TCP SMTP y realizar la autenticaci\u00f3n SMTP (SMTP AUTH) con credenciales v\u00e1lidas, el servidor acepta dominios de remitente arbitrarios sin aplicar ninguna vinculaci\u00f3n de dominio a cuenta. Como resultado, un atacante de cualquier inquilino puede suplantar otros dominios de inquilinos, produciendo mensajes que pasan la validaci\u00f3n SPF y DMARC. NOTA: La posici\u00f3n de N-able es que el comportamiento es una funcionalidad intencionada de su arquitectura de retransmisi\u00f3n SMTP compartida y que el servicio no declara que aplique la vinculaci\u00f3n de dominio de remitente por inquilino."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-68624",
"lastModified": "2026-10-14T19:10:00.297",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 4.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-68624",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-17T16:14:20.384301Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-14T01:16:27.220",
"references": [
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "https://deepsec.net/speaker.html#PSLOT782"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/alessandrobertoldi/1ebe0f48aa0119d787ac0ff710057d92"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"url": "https://www.n-able.com/products/mail-assure"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jun/10"
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"url": "https://github.com/alessandrobertoldi/research/blob/main/infinity-day-at-scale-deepsec2025.pdf"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-290"
}
],
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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