FKIE_CVE-2025-68262
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-12-16 15:15 - Updated: 2026-10-14 13:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"crypto/zstd.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "dc0f4509b0ed5d82bef78e058db0ac4df04d0695",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f5ad93ffb54119a8dc5e18f070624d4ead586969",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "e983feaa79de1e46c9087fb9f02fedb0e5397ce6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f5ad93ffb54119a8dc5e18f070624d4ead586969",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "48bc9da3c97c15f1ea24934bcb3b736acd30163d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f5ad93ffb54119a8dc5e18f070624d4ead586969",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"crypto/zstd.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.17"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.17",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.17.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.17.12",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.1",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.19",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: zstd - fix double-free in per-CPU stream cleanup\n\nThe crypto/zstd module has a double-free bug that occurs when multiple\ntfms are allocated and freed.\n\nThe issue happens because zstd_streams (per-CPU contexts) are freed in\nzstd_exit() during every tfm destruction, rather than being managed at\nthe module level. When multiple tfms exist, each tfm exit attempts to\nfree the same shared per-CPU streams, resulting in a double-free.\n\nThis leads to a stack trace similar to:\n\n BUG: Bad page state in process kworker/u16:1 pfn:106fd93\n page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x106fd93\n flags: 0x17ffffc0000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)\n page_type: 0xffffffff()\n raw: 0017ffffc0000000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000\n raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000\n page dumped because: nonzero entire_mapcount\n Modules linked in: ...\n CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 2506 Comm: kworker/u16:1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G B\n Hardware name: ...\n Workqueue: btrfs-delalloc btrfs_work_helper\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80\n bad_page+0x71/0xd0\n free_unref_page_prepare+0x24e/0x490\n free_unref_page+0x60/0x170\n crypto_acomp_free_streams+0x5d/0xc0\n crypto_acomp_exit_tfm+0x23/0x50\n crypto_destroy_tfm+0x60/0xc0\n ...\n\nChange the lifecycle management of zstd_streams to free the streams only\nonce during module cleanup."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\ncrypto: zstd - correcci\u00f3n de doble liberaci\u00f3n en la limpieza de flujos por CPU\n\nEl m\u00f3dulo crypto/zstd tiene un error de doble liberaci\u00f3n que ocurre cuando se asignan y liberan m\u00faltiples tfms.\n\nEl problema ocurre porque los zstd_streams (contextos por CPU) se liberan en zstd_exit() durante cada destrucci\u00f3n de tfm, en lugar de ser gestionados a nivel de m\u00f3dulo. Cuando existen m\u00faltiples tfms, cada salida de tfm intenta liberar los mismos flujos compartidos por CPU, lo que resulta en una doble liberaci\u00f3n.\n\nEsto conduce a un seguimiento de pila similar a:\n\n BUG: Estado de p\u00e1gina incorrecto en el proceso kworker/u16:1 pfn:106fd93\n p\u00e1gina: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x106fd93\n flags: 0x17ffffc0000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)\n page_type: 0xffffffff()\n raw: 0017ffffc0000000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000\n raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000\n p\u00e1gina volcada porque: entire_mapcount distinto de cero\n M\u00f3dulos enlazados: ...\n CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 2506 Comm: kworker/u16:1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G B\n Nombre del hardware: ...\n Cola de trabajo: btrfs-delalloc btrfs_work_helper\n Traza de llamada:\n \u003cTAREA\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80\n bad_page+0x71/0xd0\n free_unref_page_prepare+0x24e/0x490\n free_unref_page+0x60/0x170\n crypto_acomp_free_streams+0x5d/0xc0\n crypto_acomp_exit_tfm+0x23/0x50\n crypto_destroy_tfm+0x60/0xc0\n ...\n\nCambiar la gesti\u00f3n del ciclo de vida de zstd_streams para liberar los flujos solo una vez durante la limpieza del m\u00f3dulo."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-68262",
"lastModified": "2026-10-14T13:10:00.187",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2025-12-16T15:15:55.697",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/48bc9da3c97c15f1ea24934bcb3b736acd30163d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc0f4509b0ed5d82bef78e058db0ac4df04d0695"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e983feaa79de1e46c9087fb9f02fedb0e5397ce6"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred"
}
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