FKIE_CVE-2025-68248
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-12-16 15:15 - Updated: 2026-10-14 13:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/misc/vmw_balloon.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "aa05a044c5c2e147d726ac2fae1a97e0775eac11",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3544c4faccb8f0867bc65f8007ee70bfb5054305",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "4ba5a8a7faa647ada8eae61a36517cf369f5bbe4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3544c4faccb8f0867bc65f8007ee70bfb5054305",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/misc/vmw_balloon.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.17"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.17",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.17.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.17.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvmw_balloon: indicate success when effectively deflating during migration\n\nWhen migrating a balloon page, we first deflate the old page to then\ninflate the new page.\n\nHowever, if inflating the new page succeeded, we effectively deflated the\nold page, reducing the balloon size.\n\nIn that case, the migration actually worked: similar to migrating+\nimmediately deflating the new page. The old page will be freed back to\nthe buddy.\n\nRight now, the core will leave the page be marked as isolated (as we\nreturned an error). When later trying to putback that page, we will run\ninto the WARN_ON_ONCE() in balloon_page_putback().\n\nThat handling was changed in commit 3544c4faccb8 (\"mm/balloon_compaction:\nstop using __ClearPageMovable()\"); before that change, we would have\ntolerated that way of handling it.\n\nTo fix it, let\u0027s just return 0 in that case, making the core effectively\njust clear the \"isolated\" flag + freeing it back to the buddy as if the\nmigration succeeded. Note that the new page will also get freed when the\ncore puts the last reference.\n\nNote that this also makes it all be more consistent: we will no longer\nunisolate the page in the balloon driver while keeping it marked as being\nisolated in migration core.\n\nThis was found by code inspection."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\nvmw_balloon: indicar \u00e9xito al desinflar efectivamente durante la migraci\u00f3n\n\nAl migrar una p\u00e1gina balloon, primero desinflamos la p\u00e1gina antigua para luego inflar la nueva p\u00e1gina.\n\nSin embargo, si la inflaci\u00f3n de la nueva p\u00e1gina tuvo \u00e9xito, desinflamos efectivamente la p\u00e1gina antigua, reduciendo el tama\u00f1o del balloon.\n\nEn ese caso, la migraci\u00f3n realmente funcion\u00f3: similar a migrar + desinflar inmediatamente la nueva p\u00e1gina. La p\u00e1gina antigua ser\u00e1 liberada de vuelta al buddy.\n\nAhora mismo, el n\u00facleo dejar\u00e1 la p\u00e1gina marcada como aislada (ya que devolvimos un error). Al intentar luego devolver esa p\u00e1gina, nos encontraremos con el WARN_ON_ONCE() en balloon_page_putback().\n\nEse manejo fue cambiado en el commit 3544c4faccb8 (\u0027mm/balloon_compaction: dejar de usar __ClearPageMovable()\u0027); antes de ese cambio, habr\u00edamos tolerado esa forma de manejarlo.\n\nPara solucionarlo, simplemente devolvamos 0 en ese caso, haciendo que el n\u00facleo efectivamente solo borre la bandera \u0027isolated\u0027 + liber\u00e1ndola de vuelta al buddy como si la migraci\u00f3n hubiera tenido \u00e9xito. Tenga en cuenta que la nueva p\u00e1gina tambi\u00e9n ser\u00e1 liberada cuando el n\u00facleo ponga la \u00faltima referencia.\n\nTenga en cuenta que esto tambi\u00e9n hace que todo sea m\u00e1s consistente: ya no desaislaremos la p\u00e1gina en el controlador balloon mientras la mantenemos marcada como aislada en el n\u00facleo de migraci\u00f3n.\n\nEsto fue encontrado mediante inspecci\u00f3n de c\u00f3digo."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-68248",
"lastModified": "2026-10-14T13:10:00.187",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2025-12-16T15:15:54.083",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4ba5a8a7faa647ada8eae61a36517cf369f5bbe4"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa05a044c5c2e147d726ac2fae1a97e0775eac11"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred"
}
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