FKIE_CVE-2025-68240
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-12-16 15:15 - Updated: 2026-10-14 13:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/nilfs2/segment.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "36049e81dc7f077e0e24d5b9688a7458beacef8f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3f66cc261ccb54a8e4d8d5aa51c389c19453b00c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "2f65799e2a736d556d306440c4e1e8906736117a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3f66cc261ccb54a8e4d8d5aa51c389c19453b00c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "9a6b60cb147d53968753a34805211d2e5e08c027",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3f66cc261ccb54a8e4d8d5aa51c389c19453b00c",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/nilfs2/segment.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.12"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.12",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.59",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.17.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.17.9",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnilfs2: avoid having an active sc_timer before freeing sci\n\nBecause kthread_stop did not stop sc_task properly and returned -EINTR,\nthe sc_timer was not properly closed, ultimately causing the problem [1]\nreported by syzbot when freeing sci due to the sc_timer not being closed.\n\nBecause the thread sc_task main function nilfs_segctor_thread() returns 0\nwhen it succeeds, when the return value of kthread_stop() is not 0 in\nnilfs_segctor_destroy(), we believe that it has not properly closed\nsc_timer.\n\nWe use timer_shutdown_sync() to sync wait for sc_timer to shutdown, and\nset the value of sc_task to NULL under the protection of lock\nsc_state_lock, so as to avoid the issue caused by sc_timer not being\nproperly shutdowned.\n\n[1]\nODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object: 00000000dacb411a object type: timer_list hint: nilfs_construction_timeout\nCall trace:\n nilfs_segctor_destroy fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2811 [inline]\n nilfs_detach_log_writer+0x668/0x8cc fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2877\n nilfs_put_super+0x4c/0x12c fs/nilfs2/super.c:509"
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\nnilfs2: evitar tener un sc_timer activo antes de liberar sci\n\nDebido a que kthread_stop no detuvo sc_task correctamente y devolvi\u00f3 -EINTR, el sc_timer no se cerr\u00f3 correctamente, lo que finalmente caus\u00f3 el problema [1] reportado por syzbot al liberar sci debido a que el sc_timer no estaba cerrado.\n\nDebido a que la funci\u00f3n principal del hilo sc_task, nilfs_segctor_thread(), devuelve 0 cuando tiene \u00e9xito, cuando el valor de retorno de kthread_stop() no es 0 en nilfs_segctor_destroy(), creemos que no ha cerrado correctamente sc_timer.\n\nUsamos timer_shutdown_sync() para esperar sincr\u00f3nicamente a que sc_timer se apague, y establecer el valor de sc_task en NULL bajo la protecci\u00f3n del bloqueo sc_state_lock, para evitar el problema causado por el sc_timer al no haberse apagado correctamente.\n\n[1]\nODEBUG: objeto activo libre (estado activo 0): 00000000dacb411a tipo de objeto: timer_list pista: nilfs_construction_timeout\nTraza de llamada:\n nilfs_segctor_destroy fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2811 [inline]\n nilfs_detach_log_writer+0x668/0x8cc fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2877\n nilfs_put_super+0x4c/0x12c fs/nilfs2/super.c:509"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-68240",
"lastModified": "2026-10-14T13:10:00.187",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2025-12-16T15:15:53.173",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2f65799e2a736d556d306440c4e1e8906736117a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/36049e81dc7f077e0e24d5b9688a7458beacef8f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a6b60cb147d53968753a34805211d2e5e08c027"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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