FKIE_CVE-2025-64530

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-11-13 23:15 - Updated: 2026-10-18 20:10
Severity
7.5 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Summary
Apollo Federation is an architecture for declaratively composing APIs into a unified graph. A vulnerability in versions of Apollo Federation's composition logic prior to 2.9.5, 2.10.4, 2.11.5, and 2.12.1 allowed some queries to Apollo Router to improperly bypass access controls on types/fields. Apollo Federation incorrectly allowed user-defined access control directives on interface types/fields, which could be bypassed by instead querying the implementing object types/fields in Apollo Router via inline fragments, for example. A fix to versions 2.9.5, 2.10.4, 2.11.5, and 2.12.1 of composition logic in Federation now disallows interfaces types and fields to contain user-defined access control directives. Some workarounds are available. Users of Apollo Rover with an unpatched composition version or are using the Apollo Studio build pipeline with Federation version 2.8 or below should manually copy the access control requirements on interface types/fields to each implementing object type/field where appropriate. Do not remove those access control requirements from the interface types/fields, as unpatched Apollo Composition will not automatically generate them in the supergraph schema. Customers not using Apollo Router access control features (`@authenticated`, `@requiresScopes`, or `@policy` directives) or not specifying access control requirements on interface types/fields are not affected and do not need to take action.
References
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/apollographql/federation/security/advisories/GHSA-mx7m-j9xf-62hw
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "federation",
          "vendor": "apollographql",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2.9.5"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 2.10.0-preview.0, \u003c 2.10.4"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 2.11.0-preview.0, \u003c 2.11.5"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 2.12.0-preview.0, 2.12.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Apollo Federation is an architecture for declaratively composing APIs into a unified graph. A vulnerability in versions of Apollo Federation\u0027s composition logic prior to 2.9.5, 2.10.4, 2.11.5, and 2.12.1 allowed some queries to Apollo Router to improperly bypass access controls on types/fields. Apollo Federation incorrectly allowed user-defined access control directives on interface types/fields, which could be bypassed by instead querying the implementing object types/fields in Apollo Router via inline fragments, for example. A fix to versions 2.9.5, 2.10.4, 2.11.5, and 2.12.1 of composition logic in Federation now disallows interfaces types and fields to contain user-defined access control directives. Some workarounds are available. Users of Apollo Rover with an unpatched composition version or are using the Apollo Studio build pipeline with Federation version 2.8 or below should manually copy the access control requirements on interface types/fields to each implementing object type/field where appropriate. Do not remove those access control requirements from the interface types/fields, as unpatched Apollo Composition will not automatically generate them in the supergraph schema. Customers not using Apollo Router access control features (`@authenticated`, `@requiresScopes`, or `@policy` directives) or not specifying access control requirements on interface types/fields are not affected and do not need to take action."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Apollo Federation es una arquitectura para componer APIs de forma declarativa en un grafo unificado. Una vulnerabilidad en versiones de la l\u00f3gica de composici\u00f3n de Apollo Federation anteriores a 2.9.5, 2.10.4, 2.11.5 y 2.12.1 permiti\u00f3 que algunas consultas a Apollo Router eludieran indebidamente los controles de acceso en tipos/campos. Apollo Federation permiti\u00f3 incorrectamente directivas de control de acceso definidas por el usuario en tipos/campos de interfaz, lo que podr\u00eda eludirse consultando en su lugar los tipos/campos de objeto implementadores en Apollo Router a trav\u00e9s de fragmentos en l\u00ednea, por ejemplo. Una correcci\u00f3n en las versiones 2.9.5, 2.10.4, 2.11.5 y 2.12.1 de la l\u00f3gica de composici\u00f3n en Federation ahora proh\u00edbe que los tipos y campos de interfaz contengan directivas de control de acceso definidas por el usuario. Algunas soluciones alternativas est\u00e1n disponibles. Los usuarios de Apollo Rover con una versi\u00f3n de composici\u00f3n sin parchear o que est\u00e9n utilizando el pipeline de compilaci\u00f3n de Apollo Studio con Federation versi\u00f3n 2.8 o inferior deben copiar manualmente los requisitos de control de acceso en los tipos/campos de interfaz a cada tipo/campo de objeto implementador cuando sea apropiado. No elimine esos requisitos de control de acceso de los tipos/campos de interfaz, ya que Apollo Composition sin parchear no los generar\u00e1 autom\u00e1ticamente en el esquema del supergrafo. Los clientes que no utilicen las caracter\u00edsticas de control de acceso de Apollo Router (directivas \u0027@authenticated\u0027, \u0027@requiresScopes\u0027 o \u0027@policy\u0027) o que no especifiquen requisitos de control de acceso en tipos/campos de interfaz no se ven afectados y no necesitan tomar ninguna medida."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2025-64530",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-18T20:10:00.110",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 7.5,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2025-64530",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2025-11-14T15:57:29.859868Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2025-11-13T23:15:49.993",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/apollographql/federation/security/advisories/GHSA-mx7m-j9xf-62hw"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-288"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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