FKIE_CVE-2025-64066
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-11-25 18:15 - Updated: 2026-11-05 13:10| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| primakon | project_contract_management | 1.0.18 |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "n/a",
"vendor": "n/a",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "n/a"
}
]
}
],
"source": "cve@mitre.org"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
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"cpeMatch": [
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:primakon:project_contract_management:1.0.18:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "48EDD273-2C46-43C9-9473-27D2C14040CB",
"vulnerable": true
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"negate": false,
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],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Primakon Pi Portal 1.0.18 REST /api/v2/user/register endpoint suffers from a Broken Access Control vulnerability. The endpoint fails to implement any authorization checks, allowing unauthenticated attackers to perform POST requests to register new user accounts in the application\u0027s local database. This bypasses the intended security architecture, which relies on an external Identity Provider for initial user registration and assumes that internal user creation is an administrative-only function. This vector can also be chained with other vulnerabilities for privilege escalation and complete compromise of application. This specific request can be used to also enumerate already registered user accounts, aiding in social engineering or further targeted attacks."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "El endpoint REST /api/v2/user/register de Primakon Pi Portal 1.0.18 padece de una vulnerabilidad de control de acceso roto. El endpoint no implementa ninguna comprobaci\u00f3n de autorizaci\u00f3n, lo que permite a atacantes no autenticados realizar solicitudes POST para registrar nuevas cuentas de usuario en la base de datos local de la aplicaci\u00f3n. Esto elude la arquitectura de seguridad prevista, que se basa en un proveedor de identidad externo para el registro inicial de usuarios y asume que la creaci\u00f3n interna de usuarios es una funci\u00f3n exclusiva de administraci\u00f3n. Este vector tambi\u00e9n puede encadenarse con otras vulnerabilidades para la escalada de privilegios y el compromiso completo de la aplicaci\u00f3n. Esta solicitud espec\u00edfica tambi\u00e9n puede utilizarse para enumerar cuentas de usuario ya registradas, lo que ayuda en la ingenier\u00eda social o en ataques dirigidos adicionales."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-64066",
"lastModified": "2026-11-05T13:10:00.180",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseScore": 8.6,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 4.7,
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary"
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"ssvcV203": [
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"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-64066",
"options": [
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"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
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{
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],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-11-25T20:39:39.188241Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-11-25T18:15:54.027",
"references": [
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/n3k7ar91/Vulnerabilites/blob/main/Primakon/CVE-2025-64066.md"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"tags": [
"Product"
],
"url": "https://www.primakon.com/rjesenja/primakon-pcm/"
}
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"sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
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"value": "CWE-284"
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"type": "Secondary"
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}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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