FKIE_CVE-2025-62406
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-11-18 23:15 - Updated: 2026-10-19 13:108.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "Piwigo",
"vendor": "Piwigo",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "= 15.6.0"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:piwigo:piwigo:15.6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "6DE6A721-9982-4AE7-B2D5-F9EE81CA75BE",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Piwigo is a full featured open source photo gallery application for the web. In Piwigo 15.6.0, using the password reset function allows sending a password-reset URL by entering an existing username or email address. However, the hostname used to construct this URL is taken from the HTTP request\u0027s Host header and is not validated at all. Therefore, an attacker can send a password-reset URL with a modified hostname to an existing user whose username or email the attacker knows or guesses. This issue has been patched in version 15.7.0."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Piwigo es una aplicaci\u00f3n de galer\u00eda de fotos de c\u00f3digo abierto completa para la web. En Piwigo 15.6.0, usar la funci\u00f3n de restablecimiento de contrase\u00f1a permite enviar una URL de restablecimiento de contrase\u00f1a al introducir un nombre de usuario o direcci\u00f3n de correo electr\u00f3nico existente. Sin embargo, el nombre de host utilizado para construir esta URL se toma del encabezado Host de la solicitud HTTP y no se valida en absoluto. Por lo tanto, un atacante puede enviar una URL de restablecimiento de contrase\u00f1a con un nombre de host modificado a un usuario existente cuyo nombre de usuario o correo electr\u00f3nico el atacante conoce o adivina. Este problema ha sido parcheado en la versi\u00f3n 15.7.0."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-62406",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T13:10:00.110",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 8.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.2,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-62406",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-11-19T16:13:36.150593Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-11-18T23:15:54.827",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/Piwigo/Piwigo/commit/9d2565465efc3570963ff431b45cad21610f6692"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/Piwigo/Piwigo/security/advisories/GHSA-9986-w7jf-33f6"
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/Piwigo/Piwigo/security/advisories/GHSA-9986-w7jf-33f6"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-640"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.