FKIE_CVE-2025-59048
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-10-23 16:16 - Updated: 2026-10-08 11:10| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| openbao | aws_plugin | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "openbao-plugins",
"vendor": "openbao",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 0.1.1"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:openbao:aws_plugin:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "F8269CFF-93B8-4FF9-B905-D69E7A7F4934",
"versionEndExcluding": "0.1.1",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "OpenBao\u0027s AWS Plugin generates AWS access credentials based on IAM policies. Prior to version 0.1.1, the AWS Plugin is vulnerable to cross-account IAM role Impersonation in the AWS auth method. The vulnerability allows an IAM role from an untrusted AWS account to authenticate by impersonating a role with the same name in a trusted account, leading to unauthorized access. This impacts all users of the auth-aws plugin who operate in a multi-account AWS environment where IAM role names may not be unique across accounts. This vulnerability has been patched in version 0.1.1 of the auth-aws plugin. A workaround for this issue involves guaranteeing that IAM role names are unique across all AWS accounts that could potentially interact with your OpenBao environment, and to audit for any duplicate IAM roles."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "El plugin de AWS de OpenBao genera credenciales de acceso de AWS bas\u00e1ndose en pol\u00edticas de IAM. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 0.1.1, el plugin de AWS es vulnerable a la suplantaci\u00f3n de rol de IAM entre cuentas en el m\u00e9todo de autenticaci\u00f3n de AWS. La vulnerabilidad permite que un rol de IAM de una cuenta de AWS no confiable se autentique suplantando un rol con el mismo nombre en una cuenta confiable, lo que lleva a acceso no autorizado. Esto afecta a todos los usuarios del plugin auth-aws que operan en un entorno de AWS de m\u00faltiples cuentas donde los nombres de los roles de IAM pueden no ser \u00fanicos entre cuentas. Esta vulnerabilidad ha sido parcheada en la versi\u00f3n 0.1.1 del plugin auth-aws. Una soluci\u00f3n alternativa para este problema implica garantizar que los nombres de los roles de IAM sean \u00fanicos en todas las cuentas de AWS que podr\u00edan interactuar potencialmente con su entorno OpenBao, y auditar cualquier rol de IAM duplicado."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-59048",
"lastModified": "2026-10-08T11:10:00.250",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 8.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.2,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-59048",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2025-10-23T15:40:38.319550Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2025-10-23T16:16:43.190",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/openbao/openbao-plugins/commit/2a77af36834746ca6d3ac9bd1049154c84b3efae"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/openbao/openbao-plugins/security/advisories/GHSA-jp7h-4f3c-9rc7"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-694"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-863"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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