FKIE_CVE-2025-58763

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2025-09-09 21:15 - Updated: 2026-10-19 17:10
Severity
8.0 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
7.2 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
Tautulli is a Python based monitoring and tracking tool for Plex Media Server. A command injection vulnerability in Tautulli v2.15.3 and prior allows attackers with administrative privileges to obtain remote code execution on the application server. This vulnerability requires the application to have been cloned from GitHub and installed manually. When Tautulli is cloned directly from GitHub and installed manually, the application manages updates and versioning through calls to the `git` command. In the code, this is performed through the `runGit` function in `versioncheck.py`. Since `shell=True` is passed to `subproces.Popen`, this call is vulnerable to subject to command injection, as shell characters within arguments will be passed to the underlying shell. A concrete location where this can be triggered is in the `checkout_git_branch` endpoint. This endpoint stores a user-supplied remote and branch name into the `GIT_REMOTE` and `GIT_BRANCH` configuration keys without sanitization. Downstream, these keys are then fetched and passed directly into `runGit` using a format string. Hence, code execution can be obtained by using `$()` interpolation in a command. Version 2.16.0 contains a fix for the issue.
References
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/Tautulli/Tautulli/security/advisories/GHSA-jrm9-r57q-6cvfExploit, Vendor Advisory
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
tautulli tautulli *
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "Tautulli",
          "vendor": "Tautulli",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2.16.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:tautulli:tautulli:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "2DC34660-238E-4602-816E-D7DA8D91E923",
              "versionEndExcluding": "2.16.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Tautulli is a Python based monitoring and tracking tool for Plex Media Server. A command injection vulnerability in Tautulli v2.15.3 and prior allows attackers with administrative privileges to obtain remote code execution on the application server. This vulnerability requires the application to have been cloned from GitHub and installed manually. When Tautulli is cloned directly from GitHub and installed manually, the application manages updates and versioning through calls to the `git` command. In the code, this is performed through the `runGit` function in `versioncheck.py`. Since `shell=True` is passed to `subproces.Popen`, this call is vulnerable to subject to command injection, as shell characters within arguments will be passed to the underlying shell. A concrete location where this can be triggered is in the `checkout_git_branch` endpoint. This endpoint stores a user-supplied remote and branch name into the `GIT_REMOTE` and `GIT_BRANCH` configuration keys without sanitization. Downstream, these keys are then fetched and passed directly into `runGit` using a format string. Hence, code execution can be obtained by using `$()` interpolation in a command. Version 2.16.0 contains a fix for the issue."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Tautulli es una herramienta de monitoreo y seguimiento basada en Python para Plex Media Server. Una vulnerabilidad de inyecci\u00f3n de comandos en Tautulli v2.15.3 y anteriores permite a los atacantes con privilegios administrativos obtener ejecuci\u00f3n remota de c\u00f3digo en el servidor de aplicaciones. Esta vulnerabilidad requiere que la aplicaci\u00f3n haya sido clonada de GitHub e instalada manualmente. Cuando Tautulli se clona directamente de GitHub y se instala manualmente, la aplicaci\u00f3n gestiona las actualizaciones y el versionado a trav\u00e9s de llamadas al comando \u0027git\u0027. En el c\u00f3digo, esto se realiza a trav\u00e9s de la funci\u00f3n \u0027runGit\u0027 en \u0027versioncheck.py\u0027. Dado que \u0027shell=True\u0027 se pasa a \u0027subprocess.Popen\u0027, esta llamada es vulnerable a inyecci\u00f3n de comandos, ya que los caracteres de shell dentro de los argumentos se pasar\u00e1n al shell subyacente. Una ubicaci\u00f3n concreta donde esto puede ser activado es en el endpoint \u0027checkout_git_branch\u0027. Este endpoint almacena un nombre de rama y remoto proporcionado por el usuario en las claves de configuraci\u00f3n \u0027GIT_REMOTE\u0027 y \u0027GIT_BRANCH\u0027 sin sanitizaci\u00f3n. Posteriormente, estas claves se recuperan y se pasan directamente a \u0027runGit\u0027 utilizando una cadena de formato. Por lo tanto, la ejecuci\u00f3n de c\u00f3digo puede obtenerse utilizando la interpolaci\u00f3n \u0027$()\u0027 en un comando. La versi\u00f3n 2.16.0 contiene una soluci\u00f3n para el problema."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2025-58763",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-19T17:10:00.173",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.0,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.3,
        "impactScore": 6.0,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      },
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.2,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.2,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2025-58763",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2025-09-10T13:32:29.871622Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2025-09-09T21:15:38.563",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/Tautulli/Tautulli/security/advisories/GHSA-jrm9-r57q-6cvf"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-78"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.